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Article
THE BITTER PILL OF EMPIRICISM: HEALTH MAINTENANCE
ORGANIZATIONS, INFORMED CONSENT AND THE REASONABLE
PSYCHOTHERAPIST STANDARD OF CARE
GEOFFREY R. MARCzYK*
ELLEN WERTHEIMER**
I. INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM
F OR the first time, those who practice psychotherapy need to show re-
sults, and not just to the patient. The therapist-patient relationship
has acquired a third member: the Health Maintenance Organization
("HMO"). Thus, patient satisfaction is no longer enough: the insurer
must also be satisfied. Because their decisions to pay for treatment are
based on predictions about effectiveness, and not on post-treatment actual
success, HMOs are only satisfied by (and will only pay for) treatments sup-
ported by scientifically generated data.
This need to justify economically the cost of treatment has collided
with the philosophical foundation of the profession pursuant to which
treatment choices may be based upon philosophy, and not upon a track
record of success.' The source of this collision lies in managed care,
which will reimburse treatment only insofar as it can be proven effective,
and only for the fewest sessions that can be justified.2 The therapist must
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the staff of the Villanova Law Review-for their diligence and effort.
** Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law. B.A., J.D., Yale. I
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preparing this Article.
1. With the explosion of managed care in the last fifteen years, behavioral
healthcare providers have found themselves lodged between the proverbial rock
and a hard place: do they honor their ethical obligation to provide their client with
a treatment plan selected solely on the basis of the therapist's professional judg-
ment and the client's interest-thus risking expulsion from the coveted preferred-
provider list-or do they breach that obligation by providing compromised treat-
ment dictated by a third party; thereby ensuring a continued source of patient
referrals and the success of their practice?
2. See Steven C. Hayes, What Do We Want from Scientific Standards of Psychological
Practice?, in SCIENTIFIC STANDARDS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL PRACTICE: ISSUES AND RECOM-
MENDATIONS 63 (Steven C. Hayes et al. eds., 1995) [hereinafter SCIENTIFIC STAN-
DARDS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL PRACTICE] (noting that "[t]he key to the development of
scientifically-based practice standards are the changes that are occurring in the
health care delivery system in this country").
(33)
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not only make the patient happy, but also the patient's insurance com-
pany. 3 Otherwise, the insurance company will not pay for the treatment,
and the patient may not seek it.4
This collision between payors and practice has already occurred in
the context of medical care; its effects dominate choices of treatment and
often create tragic conflict when HMOs deny treatments on the grounds
that a treatment is experimental or not empirically justified. The doctors
(and their patients) are no longer the sole decision-makers. The HMOs
do much of the deciding, and their decisions are rooted in economics and
not necessarily in the patients' interests. 5
The effects of HMO demands for empirically supported treatments
are now spreading into the realm of psychotherapy. 6 Because of the na-
3. See Jeffrey Barnett & Steven Shearer, Managed Care Bad for Our Mental
Health, WASH. Bus. J., July 14, 1997, at 1 (noting that powerful managed care com-
panies expected to control every aspect of health-care market including training
clinicians to exercise beliefs and skills consistent with theirs), available at http://
www.bizjournals.com/washington/stories/1997/07/14/editorial4.html. As man-
aged care organizations wage war on mental healthcare costs in an effort to remain
profitable, Americans suffering from a mental disorder are often left untreated
and, perhaps worse, mistreated. See Mental Health: Does Therapy Help?, CONSUMER
REP., Nov. 1995, at 734 (discussing recent government study which shows that less
than one-third of fifty million Americans who suffer from mental or addictive ill-
ness at any given time receive treatment that they need). Despite the fact that over
one-half of the states in this country have passed mental health parity laws requir-
ing equality in the provision of mental health benefits, these benefits continue to
be doled out at an alarmingly disproportionate rate to those dispensed for general
healthcare. See Steven Findlay, Managed Behavioral Health Care in 1999: An Industry
at a Crossroads, HEALTH AFF., Sept.-Oct. 1999, at 116, 122, available at LEXIS, News
Library, Medical and Health Materials Combined File (noting that as ofJune 1999,
twenty-four states had passed mental health parity laws with additional twenty states
in process of enacting similar legislation); Mental Health: A Little Goes a Long Way,
AM. HEALTH LINE, Oct. 1, 1999, available at LEXIS, News Library, Medical and
Health Materials Combined File (discussing discrepancies between managed care
coverage of mental versus physical health). The average hospital stay dropped
23%, from 6.8 to 5.2 days, between 1990 and 1993, while the average stay in a
psychiatric hospital fell by almost 50%, from 20.7 to 10.9 days. See id. Additionally,
one study reported that when a large behavioral healthcare firm replaced a fee-for-
service system with a case-rate system (a.k.a. managed care), psychiatric outpatient
treatment fell by twenty-five percent. See id.
4. See LINDA SELIGMAN, SELECTING EFFECTIVE TREATMENTS 340 (1990) (noting
that managed care organizations emphasize brief treatment of mental disorders,
offer little choice of treatment provider and pay little attention to need for ex-
tended treatment and prevention, resulting in clients having to pay their own psy-
chotherapy bills or failing to receive needed treatment).
5. See Andy Miller, Managed Care and Mental Health; A Revolution in Treatment;
Patients' Choices Have Narrowed; 'Hassle Factor' Is Much Greater, ATLANTA J. & CONST.,
Aug. 30, 1998, at RI (stating that managed care companies may be focused on
"bottom line" instead of patient improvement and noting that only $3 of every
$100 in health care benefits are spent on behavioral health).
6. See Hayes, supra note 2, at 50 (addressing why such standards are not al-
ready well established). According to Hayes:
Why do we not already have scientifically-based standards of psycho-
logical practice? You might be tempted to say that it has not already been
[Vol. 46: p. 33
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ture of psychotherapy, the problems presented by HMO demands are
even more intense than the problems created for medical doctors. In the
medical context, there is at least some empirical justification for every
treatment offered to a patient.7 Those treatments based solely on philoso-
phy ended when the allopaths won control of the medical profession.8
done because the state of the science has not been such that it was possi-
ble. It is true that the state of applied psychological science thirty years
ago was nothing like what it is today. But there is more to it than that.
The whole idea of scientifically-oriented professional disciplines is
not very old. Professions have succeeded for centuries in hiding what
they do from public view. Special languages were developed, special
training barriers were erected. A fair look at the history of guilds shows
that these special qualities and processes were developed in part precisely
because they mystified the public. The rise of psychology as a profession has
been marked by the rise of psychology as a guild. Standards of practice
that are science-based are deeply foreign to the structure and functioning
of professional guilds. This is a transition that will not come easily.
What we are witnessing in the standards of care movement is the
development of a new view about what professionals should be, notjust in
psychology but also in society at large. The people and their representa-
tives (government, industry, the media, the courts) no longer genuflect
in front of the centuries old mumbo jumbo of guilds. They are refusing
to be put off by undocumented claims to special knowledge. As a result
we are beginning to see the vague outlines of a day in which practicing
psychologists will actually know and will actually follow the scientific liter-
ature. At least at first they will do it not because they value science but
because they will be held accountable-by insurance companies, by the
government, by agencies, by funding sources, by consumers, and by the
profession.
This change is not just happening in psychology. It is happening in
medicine, engineering, industry-in all areas of human functioning. But
we have to face facts: if we go down this road, the old way of certifying
professionals and of protecting the profession will be threatened. And
that is the biggest reason that it has not already happened-intuitively
the guild realizes that scientifically based standards of care will be a very
real threat to the well understood and successful means they have always
used to create a sense of value and specialness about the profession.
Id. at 50-51; see also Sam Leigland, On the Relation Between Clinical Practice and Psycho-
logical Science, in SCIENTIFIC STANDARDS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL PRACTICE, supra note 2, at
69 (noting that "clinical psychology faces the problem of attachment to a scientific
field that provides very little in the way of basic scientific knowledge regarding
clinical phenomena").
7. Faith healing is excepted from this class of treatments.
8. Herbal remedies and the like are not an issue in terms of managed care,
because managed care entities do not pay for them anyway. See GregoryJ. Hayes,
Lessons from Medicine, in SCIENTIFIC STANDARDS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL PRACTICE, supra
note 2, at 92-94 (discussing American Medical Association's struggle to improve
quality of medical practice in early 1900s). Abraham Flexner, an expert in educa-
tional reform and the author of the Flexner Report, is credited with improving
medical education in the United States. See id. at 92. He felt that there were too
many poorly trained physicians practicing and that "society was being denied the
fruits of current scientific knowledge .... " Id. at 93. Flexner felt that only the best
medical schools should be allowed to operate, and, consequently, medical schools
not affiliated with major universities soon faded into extinction. See id. On psy-
chology and quality of practice, Hayes notes:
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This is not true, however, in the realm of psychotherapy. Choices of treat-
ment depend heavily on the philosophical basis of the particular form of
psychotherapy at issue, and empirical justifications may be few and far be-
tween. They may also be equivocal, a fact that creates its own dilemmas.
As a result, a patient who approaches a psychotherapist must confront
a new choice-whether to proceed with a particular treatment that may
well go uncompensated by the patient's insurance provider, or to choose a
form of treatment that will be compensated. Certainly, the choice of the
average patient will be affected by whether a proposed treatment is cov-
ered by his or her health plan. The need for the patient to make this
choice means that the patient must be educated to do so. This creates a
new obligation-or what may appear to be a new obligation-for the ther-
apist, which is to disclose both the reimbursement status of and alternative
treatments to the proposed course of therapy. Because of the nature of
psychotherapy, in which the form of treatment will probably depend in
part upon the philosophical beliefs of the therapist, these alternative treat-
ments may well involve therapists other than the one initially consulted,
unless the particular therapist has an unusually eclectic approach. Disclo-
sure may also require that the therapist present options with which that
therapist disagrees. For those conditions for which medication is at least a
possible treatment, disclosure will involve sending the patient to a physi-
cian as well.
HMO insistence upon empirical evidence will change psychotherapy
in numerous ways. Two of these changes, on which this Article will focus,
are the development of a discernable standard of care-what the reasona-
ble therapist should do in the circumstances-and a concomitant change
in the content of informed consent, with the therapist obligated to inform
the patient about alternative treatments and their success rates. The idea
of coupling alternative treatments and success rates arises out of the devel-
opment of the standard of care, with its implication that some treatments
have more empirical support than others. If a particular treatment has
strong empirical support, it may be negligent for a therapist to fail to offer
The creation of a scientific base for psychology has lagged behind that of
medicine. But it has nonetheless made great strides in the past several
decades .... Psychology has reached a level in its development where it
can offer effective diagnosis and treatment in many circumstances. But as
was true of medicine 85 years ago, not all psychologists are competent to
utilize this knowledge. Many lack the training and skills. It is thus clear
that the need for a Flexner-like report on psychological education in the
United States . . . is fast approaching. The growing pressures for maxi-
mizing quality and minimizing cost in the health and mental health are-
nas demand that we pursue practical, workable, yet scientific standards of
clinical practice in both medicine and psychology without delay.
Id. at 94. For a discussion of the history of medicine, see JOHN P. DOLAN & WiL-
LIAM N. ADAMS-SMITH, HEALTH AND SOCIETY: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
MEDICINE (1978), which discusses the history of medicine in a societal context, and
JACALYN DUFFIN, HISTORY OF MEDICINE: A SCANDALOUSLY SHORT INTRODUCTION
(1999), which discusses the evolution of medicine as a science.
[Vol. 46: p. 33
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that treatment. Moreover, an HMO may refuse to pay for any treatment
other than the one with the strongest chance of success. This empirically
supported treatment may thus become the standard of care, with the ther-
apist negligent for offering anything else. In a profession in which the
choice of treatment may be based on the philosophy of the therapist and
not upon empirical data, this change may be cataclysmic.
The focus of this Article will be on the intersection between managed
care's demand for empirically supported results and psychotherapy's per-
ception of itself as driven by theory rather than by empiricism. This inter-
section has created a survival crisis for psychotherapists, who often cannot
continue to practice in the absence of reimbursement. The obligation of
informed consent and the fact that patient choices of treatment may be
reimbursement-driven place a huge burden on the profession, which now
must justify its own existence in a new way. Those driving the reimburse-
ment-based decisions, however, must be careful that what amounts to their
supervision of the profession is done with care and knowledge, and not
just a concern for the bottom line. The idea of HMOs creating the stan-
dard of care through reimbursement decisions is a frightening one. It has
had an impact on medical practice. The potential impact on psychother-
apy is even greater because the determination of a successful treatment is
itself nebulous.
This Article begins with an examination of the profession of psycho-
therapy, focusing on the tension between the philosophical bases of ther-
apy and the need for empirical justification of those therapies.9 The
Article then examines informed consent in the medical profession gener-
ally.10 Next, the Article turns to the application of the doctrine of in-
formed consent to psychotherapy, concluding that informed consent,
even in the days before managed care, received undeservedly short shrift
in the context of talk therapy.11 Finally, the Article examines the impact
of managed care on psychotherapy, paying specific attention to the idea of
informed consent. 12
Managed care, with its focus on the bottom line, is forcing psycho-
therapy into changing its fundamental nature, from a philosophy-based
profession into one emphasizing quick and discernible "cures." The in-
formed consent problem poses itself in this context. Therapists have al-
ways had an obligation to inform their patients about alternative
approaches, although they have largely ignored this obligation. This obli-
9. For a discussion of the profession of psychotherapy and the tension be-
tween the philosophical basis of therapy and the need for empirical justification of
those therapies, see infra notes 13-139 and accompanying text.
10. For a discussion of informed consent in the medical profession generally,
see infra notes 22-26 and accompanying text.
11. For a discussion of the application of the doctrine of informed consent to
psychotherapy, see infra notes 162-258 and accompanying text.
12. For a discussion of the impact of managed care on psychotherapy, see
infra notes 259-68 and accompanying text.
2001]
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gation takes on a new dimension in the managed care context. Managed
care's focus on costs compels the profession of psychotherapy to figure out
ways to prove its treatments worthy of reimbursement. This proof will con-
sequently impose a more uniform standard of care that will in turn engen-
der the need for therapists to inform their patients of empirically
supported treatments.
II. PHILOSOPHY V. EMPIRICISM: THE PROOF OF THE PUDDING
Put simply, the problem is one of philosophy versus science, empiri-
cism versus pure theory, and accountability versus a lack thereof. Much
psychotherapy is based on philosophy, the philosophy of the mind and the
study of the soul. 13 This is at least partly due to the mysterious nature of
the mind itself. The mind cannot be cured of its problems with a dose of
penicillin. On the other hand, the success of efforts to cure psychological
problems can be measured, at least to some extent.
The field of psychology can trace its origins to the philosophical
thought of Aristotle, who used simple concepts to explain the relationship
between the nature of human experience and mental processes. 14 Dissat-
isfaction with this purely philosophical model gave rise to psychological
schools of thought that stressed observable phenomena.' 5 Over time,
these two paradigms have vied for dominance. Each paradigm has gained
the upper hand before being displaced by a different theory that gained
the acceptance of the then-young discipline. The discipline took on the
characteristics of a pendulum, swinging slowly and inevitably from one
side to the other. As a result, the discipline was unable to produce a uni-
fied theory of behavior that comfortably incorporated both of its historical
traditions.
The result of this diversity and lack of consensus is a wide range of
psychological schools of thought and practices, some driven by observa-
tion and others driven by pure theory. It was not until the work of
Sigmund Freud in the 1900s, however, that the discipline began to focus
on the diagnosis and treatment of the mentally ill. 16 Because it was diffi-
cult to define, understand and treat mental illness, treatment models at
13. See ANN F. NEEL, THEORIES OF PSYCHOLOGY- A HANDBOOK 21 (2d ed. 1977)
(stating that early psychological theory was "part and parcel of philosophy"); see
also id. at 33 (noting that psychology incorporated branches of philosophy con-
cerned with mind and behavior).
14. See id. at 21, 23 (noting that psychology arose from philosophical move-
ment of Associationism whose basic principles were conceived by Aristotle); see also
id. at 33 (noting that psychology incorporated philosophy dating back to Aristotle
and Ancients).
15. See, e.g., id. at 28-30 (discussing how transformation of Philosophical Asso-
ciationism into Psychological Associationism was affected by empirical ap-
proaches); see also id. at 33 (noting that Structuralist school of psychology marked
separation of psychology from philosophy as discipline concerned with objective
study of human mind and behavior).
16. See generally id. at 225-58 (discussing Freud's contributions to psychology).
[Vol. 46: p. 33
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once took on a strong theoretical approach. This in turn meant that sys-
tematic evaluation of success rates was virtually impossible. Thus, empiri-
cism was subsumed in the interest of improving the human condition.
As a result, the recent history of psychology is notable for the variety
and number of schools of psychotherapy. 17 These schools are numerous,
but few are concerned with empirical underpinnings, preferring instead
to focus on patient improvement and theoretical convenience. This theo-
retical/ philosophical model has dominated psychological treatment mo-
dalities for approximately the last fifty years. Although this domination of
psychological thought is noteworthy, it also appears to be temporary. Re-
cent history suggests that the pendulum is involuntarily swinging in favor
of the forces of empiricism.
Ironically, it appears that the lack of empirical support for most mod-
ern treatment modalities is itself driving the resurgence of empiricism in
the discipline. One of the major goals of managed care is to provide only
those services that are needed by eliminating unnecessary treatment.' 8 As
applied to mental health treatment, this financial goal simply means that
managed care does not want to pay for psychotherapy that is ineffective or
prolonged. Accordingly, managed care has forced psychology to recon-
sider its standards of practice, as well as its very future. It is doing so by
covering those treatments that have been shown to be effective in produc-
ing symptom relief and improvement in patient functioning. In more spe-
cific terms, managed care will only cover treatments that have been
empirically validated or supported and shown to be effective. 19
This emphasis on empirically validated treatments has created a trend
towards accommodating managed care and attempting to validate, for
HMO reimbursement, a wide variety of different psychotherapies for a
wide variety of mental illnesses.20 This is not to say that there is no resis-
tance. Many members of the discipline disfavor a shift to empirically vali-
dated treatments for a number of reasons. 2 1 One of the most salient
reasons is the fear that forcing the profession to validate every treatment
17. See generally id. at 261-627 (discussing various theories of psychology to
emerge over last fifty years).
18. See G. Terence Wilson, Empirically Validated Treatments As a Basis for Clinical
Practice: Problems and Prospects, in SCIENTIFIC STANDARDS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL PRAC-
TICE, supra note 2, at 163 (discussing goals of managed care).
19. See id. (discussing limitations imposed by managed care).
20. See id. at 163-89 (discussing need for empirically validated treatments and
progress towards standardized treatment packages).
21. SeeJacqueline B. Persons, Why Practicing Psychologists Are Slow to Adopt Em-
pirically-Validated Treatments, in SCIENTIFIC STANDARDS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL PRACTICE,
supra note 2, at 141-54 (discussing various reasons why profession has been reluc-
tant to accept empirically validated treatments). Persons proposes the following
six causes: (1) psychologists receive little training in methods that are proven effi-
cient by empirical evidence; (2) psychologists often receive extensive training in
methods that are unsupported by empirical evidence of efficacy; (3) many clini-
cians fail to read the outcome literature; (4) research findings prove difficult for
clinicians to utilize; (5) many clinicians feel that all psychotherapies are equally
2001]
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will lead to the collapse of diverse treatments into one compensable form,
to the destruction of many individual schools of thought on psychotherapy
and to the financial ruin of these practitioners. Many also fear that this
will give managed care the power to regulate how psychotherapy is prac-
ticed in the future. On the other hand, it is not necessarily the case that
such validation is entirely negative: surely generating information on what
works and what fails cannot be all bad.
Managed care's insistence on empirically validated treatments also
poses other problems for the discipline. In the past, the fact that schools
of thought in psychology and psychotherapy were so diverse, not to say
nebulous, in itself protected practitioners from legal liability. In terms of
treatment and diagnosis, the standard of care for psychological treatment
remained vague because there was little agreement on the proper course
of action, so it was difficult to sue a therapist for breaching it.22 Thus, in
the past, given the lack of consensus in the field, an exact standard of care
has been difficult to determine. The shift to empirically supported treat-
ments may now provide a more scientific and universal standard of care.
If there are well validated treatments for depression and anxiety-and
there are-should therapists be able to escape liability for malpractice be-
cause their therapeutic orientation is not consistent with the validated ap-
proach? Would we accept this from the medical profession? Absolutely
not.
The existence of empirically supported treatments thus has several
effects. One is that a therapist administering a non-empirically supported
treatment may be committing malpractice. Another is that the relevant
HMO may refuse to reimburse the patient for the care received. A third
involves the therapist's obligation to disclose all alternatives and their re-
spective success rates to the patient prior to the initiation of treatment.
This last obligation might require therapists to go outside their own
school of thought in order to provide patients with necessary information.
In psychology, treatment approaches vary considerably depending on the
orientation and knowledge base of the practitioner. A therapist with a
specific orientation might not explain or offer referrals for other treat-
ment options outside their school of thought. This might be because they
effective; and (6) consumers are uninformed of the research findings. See id. at
141-42.
22. See Gerald L. Klerman, The Psychiatric Patient's Right to Effective Treatment:
Implications of Osheroff vs. Chestnut Lodge, 147 Am.J. PSYCHIATRY 409, 411 (1990)
(discussing practitioner orientation, diagnosis and treatment). Professor Klerman
notes ,that in the Osheroff case:
Resolution of both the clinical and scientific issues is made difficult by
divisions within psychiatry in the United States, where psychiatry is di-
vided theoretically and clinically into different schools-biological, psy-
choanalytic, and behavioral .... There is agreement that the differences
in theory and practice involve controversies over the nature of mental
illness [and] the appropriateness of different forms of treatment ....
[Vol. 46: p. 33
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do not accept the validity of other treatments, because they lack knowl-
edge of other empirically supported treatments or because they have de-
cided that such referrals are bad for business. So when a patient agrees to
therapy with such a practitioner (regardless of the practitioner's orienta-
tion) without being informed of other, possibly more effective, treatment
options, can there really be informed consent? If a patient wants to pur-
sue a possibly less effective therapy after being told that there might be
more effective alternatives, that is the patient's decision. But until a pa-
tient is informed of all treatment options, particularly the empirically vali-
dated or supported reimbursable ones, that patient cannot give true
informed consent. Just as with physicians, the burden should be on psy-
chotherapists to explain a full range of treatment options that include em-
pirically supported ones.
Managed care is forcing psychology and the practice of psychotherapy
to become more of a science and less of a philosophy. To meet HMO
criteria, psychology is being forced to abandon part of its historical roots
and adopt an empirical approach typified by randomized clinical trials
and effectiveness outcome studies. 23 Theory alone is no longer adequate;
empirical evidence is now required. Although the field of medicine
adopted this approach long ago with the discovery of microbes and bacte-
ria, the discipline of psychology has been reluctant to follow the same path
for financial, theoretical and legal reasons. 24
The problem is also one of accountability. In the past, it has been
difficult for the legal system to hold psychotherapists liable for treatment
and diagnostic decisions. As mentioned previously, this is due, in part, to
a nebulous and shifting standard of care-a standard of care that was at
the mercy of a wide variety of treatment modalities and psychological
schools of thought. Currently, it appears that the legal system has not
taken into account the importance of empirically supported or validated
treatments to the practice of modern psychology and psychotherapy.
These new standards of practice are the beginning of a clear standard of
care for all therapists regardless of orientation, and also breathe new life
23. See Kathleen E. Grady, Compliance with Standards of Care: Evidence from Med-
ical Research, in SCIENTIFIC STANDARDS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL PRACTICE, supra note 2, at
83-87 (discussing phases of clinical trials).
24. See generally id. at 83 (discussing application of Food and Drug Administra-
tion review process to psychological treatments). In discussing the application of
empirical validation to psychology, Grady notes:
The generalizability from the clinical practice of medicine to the clinical
practice of psychology is clearly limited .... Medicine is far ahead of
psychology in the establishment of its profession. Yet, an accepted
method for the promulgation of standards of care has not been devel-
oped, and novel approaches are still being tested. Enforcement of stan-
dards of care is uneven and, in many cases, ineffective. However, broad-
based voluntary compliance and individual commitments to professional
standards support the need for continuing efforts ....
Id. at 91.
2001]
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into the doctrine of informed consent as applied to psychological
interventions.
Informed consent has in the past proved a difficult doctrine in the
realm of psychotherapy. This is partly due to the nebulous nature of the
standard of care, which caused difficulty in defining exactly what the ther-
apist had to disclose to the patient in order to obtain informed consent.
With the advent of empirically supported treatments, some of this nebu-
lousness will dissipate, and it will be easier to prove a standard of care in
cases alleging its breach. Beyond this, however, the question of reimburse-
ment may have an effect on informed consent. One of the primary diffi-
culties of informed consent in psychotherapy is the problem of proving
damages.25 Where a therapist is being sued for failure to inform a patient
of the availability of a treatment that would be reimbursed, however, the
damages will be the unreimbursed cost of the treatment provided.
The informed consent issue reaches beyond HMOs and reimburse-
ment into a more fundamental realm. Arguably, informed consent is even
more important when a patient is paying for psychotherapy out-of-pocket,
because the managed care entity is not involved and functioning as a
quasi-quality assurance mechanism. Like managed care, the legal system
should be applying more pressure on the discipline of psychology and the
practice of psychotherapy. Ironically, by pressuring the discipline to de-
velop standards of care, HMOs may accomplish this goal. Increased ac-
countability through "suability" will force the discipline to validate its
existence in scientific terms, just as the field of medicine was forced to do
years ago. In addition, increased accountability should raise standards of
practice, improve treatment and diagnosis, weed out charlatans and in-
competents, and raise the respectability of the profession in the eyes of the
public.2 6
25. Damages in informed consent cases are difficult, even in cases involving
medical treatment. To prevail, the plaintiff must show that, had the plaintiff been
informed of alternative treatments, he or she would have selected one of the alter-
natives and thereby eliminated the negative side-effects of the treatment that was
administered. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 790 (D.C. Cir. 1972) ("A
causal connection exists when, but only when, disclosure of significant risks inci-
dental to treatment would have resulted in a decision against it."). In cases involv-
ing psychotherapy, the difficulty of proving that the patient would have been
better off with an alternative about which the patient was uninformed might well
be impossible. In reimbursement cases, however, where the patient would have
selected a reimbursable treatment if informed of its existence (or if informed that
the particular recommended treatment would not be reimbursed), the damages
will be the cost of the treatment itself. The patient would have been at least finan-
cially better off with the alternative.
26. See Hayes, supra note 2, at 49 (noting that scientific standards of practice
have potential to change practice of applied psychology). Traditionally, protec-
tion of the public has been attempted through a variety of mechanisms such as
licensure requirements and ethical codes. See id. at 49-52. Some commentators
have noted that the licensure requirement has not provided adequate protection
from poor psychological practice. See id. at 49 (stating that "licensed psychologists
have . . . 'taken license' with their clients by providing empirically unproven tech-
[Vol. 46: p. 33
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Ii. PSYCHOLOGY, PHILOSOPHY AND THEORY: THE BACKGROUND -
The development and history of psychology can best be conceptual-
ized as a battle between two opposing forces-philosophy and empiricism.
Fundamentally, psychology is a discipline based on philosophy, and can
best be characterized as theory driven. 27 Although there are basic con-
cepts and common threads that provide the foundation for most psycho-
logical concepts and schools of thought, the rifts between the theoretical
orientations and schools of thought remain substantial. 28 Indeed, the the-
oretical commonalties that provide a common language and conceptual
viewpoint for the observation-based "hard" sciences (e.g., medicine, chem-
istry and physics) are not well established or are cast aside in favor of theo-
retical neatness in psychology.29 Thus, a large number of psychological
theories and treatments flourish despite the complete absence of any em-
pirical support or basis in reality.30 This in turn means that, over time, the
nologies-as if licensing itself insures the quality of services that are delivered").
The argument continues that specific forms of professional conduct and skills (i.e.,
the application of empirically validated treatments) should be the standard rather
than focusing on a general standard such as the general practice of psychotherapy
in an unspecified modality. See id. at 50 (asserting that this must be done for good
of public and profession); see also Stephen R. Reisman, Managed Care: Some Implica-
tions for Practice and Training, in SCIENTIFIC STANDARDS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL PRACTICE,
supra note 2, at 79 (discussing total quality improvement process in context of
empirically validated treatments and managed care).
27. See B.R. HERGENHAHN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGY
5 (2d ed. 1992) (discussing science, psychology and empiricism and noting argu-
ment that psychology is not science because it relies on subjective experience).
28. See NEEL, supra note 13, at 3 (noting that theories of psychology are based
on various hypotheses and tend to lack common language or theoretical basis).
29. See id. (noting that language and concepts of one psychological system is
foreign to another). Some have characterized the approach to establish common-
ality in scientific theory as the "philosophy of science." See id. To provide a com-
mon basis among these theories, a common framework for analysis must be
established. See id. Components of this framework impose order on observable
facts and information and include: (1) basic terminology that provides an organi-
zational underpinning and point of reference; (2) the principle focus of the the-
ory; (3) theoretical boundaries and guidelines for studying the principle focus of
the theory that explain the methods of investigation; and (4) application of the
methods of investigation leading to the discovery of causal relationships and prin-
ciples. See id. at 3-4.
30. See id. at 7-8 (discussing philosophical and scientific conventions of theory
construction). Science is primarily concerned with establishing cause and effect
relationships. See id. at 7. There are two primary approaches to theory construc-
tion. The empiricist view asserts that:
[T]he goals of science can be reached only through collecting facts un-
garnished by interpretation .... [T] he value of a fact may not be immedi-
ately apparent, but . . . when enough data has been accumulated, the
complex patterns connecting isolated bits of information will be under-
stood .... Theories or extrapolations [that] anticipate the interpreta-
tions of these relationships are unscientific.
Id. Other investigators advocate a theoretical approach to understanding informa-
tion. Under a theoretical approach, "[t]heory gives the scientist an appropriate
framework within which to consider new findings. He can then be guided by their
2001]
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discipline of psychology has become fragmented, unscientific and conten-
tious.3 ' Rather than evolving as a science, psychology has remained con-
ceptual, philosophical and theoretically driven.32 The view tends to be
that scientific validation cannot prove that any one theory or treatment is
better than any other. This approach was evident at the inception of the
discipline and continues to flourish and influence the development of psy-
chological theory today despite strong financial pressures to the contrary.
The history and development of psychology is the perfect foil for analyzing
how the discipline of psychology evolved in this fashion, and also how this
evolution has led it into the current theoretical crisis that it now faces.
3 3
The historical roots of psychology can be traced to the philosophy of
Aristotle and Philosophical Associationism. 3 4 Originally, Associationism
conceptualized human experience and thinking in the context of philo-
sophical thought and focused on the basic concepts of "ideas," "images"
and "sensations."35 Associationists used these simple concepts both indi-
vidually and in combination to interpret and explain the relationship be-
tween the nature of human experience and mental processes.3 6 As
philosophers, Associationists were not interested in consciousness, emo-
tion, motivation, behavior or personality per se; did not distinguish be-
tween sensation and perception; and used logic, observations and
speculation to explore these relationships.
37
implications rather than continuing to record blindly whatever data he comes
upon. Theory can add economy and efficiency to research and point up relation-
ships one might not otherwise suspect." Id. Although these two views appear irrec-
oncilable, both seek to explain observable phenomenon. See id. at 10.
31. See generally id. at 21-61 (discussing historical foundations of psychology
and various theoretical orientations).
32. See generally id. (same).
33. See generally id. (same).
34. See id. at 21 (noting that much of science can attribute its origins to philo-
sophical thought).
35. See id. at 22 (noting that Aristotle's Associationism was influential up until
Renaissance and was then refined by modern theorists such as Thomas Hobbes,
John Locke and James Mill).
36. See id. (discussing how Associationists explained complicated thoughts
and experiences by combining basic elements as they related to ideas).
37. See id. at 23 (noting that these concepts were crude but appropriate for
conceptualizing hypotheses of era). The study of these relationships produced
three fundamental principles that explained human thought and associations. See
id. at 23-24 (discussing Aristotle's three primary laws accounting for formation of
associations). The first principle hypothesized that similar ideas become associ-
ated with one another. See id. at 23 (providing example of bread and rolls; shoes
and boots). Conversely, the second principle asserted that contrast between con-
cepts produces association. See id. (offering examples of black with white; yes with
no; up with down). Not surprisingly, the third principle focused on contiguity,
and stood for the proposition that objects become associated because of their rela-
tionship in time and space. See id. (providing example of tables with eating; chairs
with sitting; pens with writing; schools with learning; churches with praying). Al-
though these principles were established centuries ago, they are still accepted as
psychological tenets today. See id. at 27 (critiquing principles of Associationism).
[Vol. 46: p. 33
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In an attempt to explain the mental existence of humankind, Associa-
tionism began to focus on the natural behavior of man and other orga-
nisms. 38 As it evolved, Associationism began to take on a psychological
perspective by considering the content of the human experience and the
acquisition of associations.3 9 This form of Associationism, known as Psy-
chological Associationism, focused on the importance of perception of
meaningful relationships between the organism and the environment for
the formation of associations.4 0 Associationism continued to evolve, and
one can still see its influence in modern psychological schools of thought
such as Behaviorism.
4 1
In 1846, the psychological school of thought known as Structuralism
came into being.42 A blend of Associationism and empiricism, Structural-
ism was the first attempt by psychology to separate from philosophy as a
discipline through the objective study of the human mind and behavior.43
Like the Associationists, Structuralists attempted to reduce human psy-
chology and behavior into basic components called "mental elements."
44
The Structuralists hypothesized that the human consciousness was the di-
rect result of components that were similar to chemical elements. These
elements were essential to understanding the human experience and
mental function and could only be understood by analyzing the structure
of mental processes. 45 Believing that their discipline should be a pure
science, the Structuralists were the first to apply observational techniques
38. See id. at 28-30 (discussing evolution of Associationism).
39. See id. at 21-22 (noting that this occurred when empirical approaches were
applied to Associationism).
40. See id. at 28-30 (noting that Lloyd Morgan, for example, not only observed
his subjects' behavior, but also their reaction to external forces).
41. See id. at 22 (discussing theoretical advances in learning theory as charac-
teristic of final period of Associationism).
42. See id. at 33 (noting that Structuralism marked emergence of psychology
as science apart from philosophy).
43. See id. (stating that Structuralism incorporated philosophy of Aristotle and
Ancients).
44. See id. at 34 (noting that concept of mental elements was established by
Wilhelm Wundt and E.B. Tichener).
45. See id. (comparing Structuralist views of consciousness to Periodic Table of
chemical elements). The Structuralist's main focus was to:
analyze the conscious process into elements, determine the manner of
connection among these elements, and then discover the laws which gov-
ern the connection. This could only be done by studying immediate ex-
perience as it was taking place. Since experience could only be reported
by the experiencing person, it was imperative that experience be treated
as an objective phenomenon, even if it be that of the observer himself.
The Structuralists further insisted that psychology be a pure science.
No metaphysical concerns were permitted and no armchair philosophy
was tolerated. Everything was to be tested or testable. Likewise, no prac-
tical concerns were allowable. Knowledge was to be secured for its own
sake, since the search for applications was felt to sully the purity of
science.
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to the study of psychology.4 6 Given this focus, Structuralists did not see
learning, motivation, emotion, personality or behavior as appropriate ar-
eas of study for the evolving discipline of psychology.
47
Often credited with being the founder of modern psychology, Wil-
liam James created a significant paradigm shift in psychology by shifting
the focus from the theories of the Structuralists and Associationists to the-
ories that focused not only on observation and introspection, but also on
speculation. 48 James wanted to broaden the scope of psychology, and, as a
result, pursued an eclectic approach that delved into areas previously
thought unworthy of study by the Structuralists. 49 James' approach had a
significant impact on the then relatively young discipline of psychology, an
impact that is still felt today.5 ° James was unwilling to accept the idea that
human psychology could be broken down into basic elements or compo-
nents, as proposed by previous theorists such as the Structuralists and As-
sociationists. 51 Instead, he believed that the primary focus of psychology
should be the study of the relationship between physical and psychological
46. See id. (noting that desire of Structuralists to study psychology as pure sci-
ence placed restrictions on their research methodology). The two main investiga-
tive modalities employed by the Structuralists were psychophysical techniques and
classical introspection. See id. at 34-35. Three main types of psychophysical tech-
niques, which are primarily concerned with the measurement of sensory thresh-
olds, were identified by the Structuralists: the method of limits, the method of
constant stimuli and the method of average error. See id. Classical introspection,
which is a form of self-reported introspection, requires the subject to report the
observable characteristics of a stimuli without interpreting its meaning. See id. at
36. Psychologists still use these techniques, in modified forms, in the study of
human perception and behavior. See id. at 35.
47. See id. at 40-46 (noting that Structuralists were not concerned with higher
mental processes and focused instead on perception and consciousness).
48. See id. at 49 (discussing William James' contributions to development of
modern psychology).
49. See id. (noting that James did not focus on experimental work but pre-
ferred less rigid means of investigating human experience). Unlike the
Structuralists:
James did not subscribe to any particular doctrine; his thinking devel-
oped side by side with that of other theorists, and he felt free to borrow
from them, to include or exclude their concepts, depending upon the
scientific appeal a particular suggestion held for him. His flexibility led
not only to eclecticism in his own theory, but also to critical evaluation of
contemporary theories, and he thereby stimulated the development of
other psychological concepts.
Id.
50. See id. at 50 (noting that although James' interest in psychology was short-
lived, many of his contributions spark debate to this day).
51. See id. (discussing basic factors constituting James' theory). Diverging
from earlier theories, James proposed that psychology must consider certain basic
factors. See id. James proposed for the first time that psychology must take into
account the fact that the individual's perception and interpretation of the world
was critical to the understanding of human psychology. See id. For a discussion of
the Associationist and Structuralist viewpoints, see supra notes 33-50 and accompa-
nying text.
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reality.52 The study of this relationship led James to hypothesize that
there must be a physiological link to most, if not all, psychological
processes.5 3 To study these hypotheses, James once again broke from the
traditions and methods of Structuralism and Associationism. 54 Rather
than focus on pure observation, James applied less purely objective and
more theoretical means of data collection and interpretation.
55
James' greatest contributions to psychology were in the area of behav-
ior and personality and in his conceptualization of the psychological self
and self-esteem. 56 Although incomplete and controversial, James' concep-
52. See NEEL, supra note 13, at 50-51 (noting that James not only expanded
areas of study but also was first to study children, primitive groups and severely
mentally ill). To James, the study of psychology was "the science of mental life,
including the fundamental biological and neurological processes and the individ-
ual's personal experience." Id. at 50. For a discussion ofJames' conceptualization
of emotion and the nature of consciousness, see William James, A World of Pure
Experience, 1 J. PHIL. PSYCHOL. & Scl. METHODS 533-43 (1904) (discussing philo-
sophical theories of thought); William James, Does Consciousness Exist?, I J. PHIL.
PSYCHOL. & ScL. METHODS 477-91 (1904) (exploring nature of consciousness); Wil-
liam James, What is an Emotion?, 9 MIND 188-205 (1884) (discussing physiology of
emotions).
53. See NEEL, supra note 13, at 51 (discussing James' contribution to modern
study of neural transmission). James also hypothesized that psychological exper-
iences actually modified the human nervous system. See id. These alterations led
to changes in human behavior, which then satisfied biological drives and needs.
See id. Despite this biological disposition, James was adamant that individuals were
still capable of exercising free will. See id.
54. See id. (discussing James' methods of investigation).
55. See id. (noting thatJames' technique was more interpretive and less objec-
tive than classical introspection of Structuralists). Although James advocated less
structured approaches to research and interpretation, he also recognized the im-
portance of using experimental methods when practical. See id. James hypothe-
sized that there was a direct relationship between an individual's state of
consciousness and brain activity, and suggested that psychology should accept and
study this relationship. James refused to accept the Structuralist view that con-
sciousness was composed of separate elements or fragments, preferring instead to
conceptualize consciousness as a "continuous, flowing current, characterized by a
private, personal, dynamic quality." Id. at 53. In essence, James was dissatisfied
with studying the content of the human mind, and was more concerned with its
function. See HERGENHAHN, supra note 27, at 300-01 (discussing themes common
to Functionalist school of thought). In addition to redefining the concept of con-
sciousness, James was the first theorist to address higher-level mental processes that
other earlier theorists did not deem appropriate for study by psychology. See NEEL,
supra note 13, at 54 (noting that Structuralists thought human cognition was be-
yond study). For example, James was the first to study cognition, memory, emo-
tion, motivation and the human learning process-areas of human experience
previously unexplored by psychologists. See id. at 54-57 (discussing James' contri-
butions and noting that James studied these areas from psychobiological
perspective).
56. See NEEL, supra note 13, at 57 (introducing James' conceptualization of
psychological self). James' conceptualization of the psychological self was a dy-
namic interaction among three selves: the material self, the social self and the
spiritual self. See id. at 57-58 (discussing three aspects of psychological self). The
material self involved the material wealth of the individual, and the influence of
these objects played a significant role in determining one's identity. See id. at 57.
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tualization of the psychological self provided the impetus for further re-
search and intellectual discourse. More importantly, the intellectual
exchange that succeeded James' theories contributed significantly to the
development of modern conceptualizations of the psychological self and
fostered the rise of Functionalism in the late 1800s.
5 7
Building on James' theories, the Functionalists continued to attack
the more traditional schools of thought exemplified by Structuralism.5 8
Like James, the Functionalists theorized that the study of mental
processes, as opposed to the contents of the human mind, was the proper
direction for the new science of psychology to follow.59 More specifically,
the Functionalists were interested in studying mental processes as they ap-
plied to an entity's ability to adjust and function within its environment. 60
Integral to this theoretical position was the development of the "stimulus-
response" sequence, which was the forerunner of modern Behaviorism
and focused primarily on the study of mental processes as they mediated
between the individual and the environment. 6 1 To study this relationship,
the Functionalists de-emphasized empiricism and adopted a flexible re-
The social self referred to how an individual was perceived and treated by others.
See id. Interaction with various social groups affected a person's perception of self-
worth, success and failure. See id. An inability to function in certain social environ-
ments created psychological discomfort or disturbance, which frequently resulted
in a change in self-concept. See id. The spiritual self represented "the individual's
intellectual capacities, his sensibilities, his will-all of the faculties of his mind in
combination. The spiritual self was what the individual thought of as his true self,
as 'me.'" Id. at 58. Discrepancies between the three aspects of self could produce
mild to severe emotional discomfort. See id.
57. See id. at 58-60 (noting that concept of self has become tremendously im-
portant topic of research); see also HERGENHAHN, supra note 27, at 300 (noting that
focus on individual marked rise of Functionalism).
58. See NEEL, supra note 13, at 63 (noting that discontentment with Structural-
ist viewpoint helped promote rise of Functionalism); see also HERGENHAHN, supra
note 27, at 300-31 (discussing Functionalist attack on Structuralism). But see Mary
Whiton Calkins, A Reconciliation Between Structural and Functional Psychology, 8
PSYCHOL. REv. 61, 61-81 (1906) (attempting to reconcile diametrically opposed
view points of Structuralists and Functionalists).
59. See HERGENHAHN, supra note 27, at 300-01 (noting that Functionalists were
interested in what mind is for rather than what it is); see also NEEL, supra note 13, at
64-65 (noting that this mode of thought was considered "radical" at time). James
had anticipated the inevitable conflict between his theories and those of the Struc-
turalists. See id. at 64. In an attempt to allow both theoretical orientations to coex-
ist, James distinguished between structural psychology, which was concerned only
with the content of the mind, and functional psychology, which was concerned
with mental processes and their biological correlates. See id. Emphasizing this con-
trast, James asserted that Structuralism could still play an integral part in under-
standing the human consciousness, but was only a part of a much larger and
complex picture. See id.
60. See NEEL, supra note 13, at 64 (noting this was part of general effort to
extend studies of mental processes beyond content of mind).
61. See id. at 64-65 (noting that Functionalism quickly gained support from
both American and European psychologists). Although unconscious autonomic
mental activities (i.e., habit) were within the purview of the Functionalists, they
continued in the tradition of James and focused on conscious activities and their
[Vol. 46: p. 33
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search approach to study the conscious experience and devised methodol-
ogies to fit the given problem or research question being posed.62 In sum,
the overall Functionalist approach identified basic stimulus response units
and how the units interacted in a coordinated fashion to produce human
behavior.63 Although the Functionalist school of thought was criticized as
being more of a vague "abstract statement of principles" than a scientific
body of knowledge, its unique psycho-physiological orientation promoted
research for years to come and was directly responsible for the rise of
Behaviorism. 64
Generally, Behaviorism was founded in direct response to the short-
comings inherent in the theories of both the Structuralists and the Func-
impact on human adjustment to the environment. See id. at 66 (contrasting habit-
ual and conscious activities).
62. See id. at 66-67 (noting that in addition to laboratory experimentation,
Functionalists used philosophy, literature and art in their research). This flew di-
rectly in the face of the Structuralists and opened many new areas of investigation
for psychology. See id. at 66.
63. See id, at 67 (noting that conscious behavior could be identified by creativ-
ity, problem-solving value or adaptiveness). On the nature of consciousness, the
Functionalists once again focused on the individual's responses to the environ-
ment, asserting that consciousness "was synonymous with adaptation, [because] it
mediated between the environment and the organism's needs." Id. at 68. Accord-
ingly, and with mixed results, the Functionalists applied this same theoretical con-
struct to other aspects of the human experience such as sensation, cognition,
emotion, motivation, behavior and personality. See id. at 68-72 (describing contri-
butions of Functionalist theory to understanding human behavior).
64. See id. at 73-74 (giving critique of Functionalist movement). The school of
Psychological Associationism followed Functionalism and established the basis for
early learning theory. See id. at 81 (discussing Associationism's influence on disci-
pline of psychology from 1898 to 1938). Driven by the study of animal behavior,
Associationist theorists such as E.L. Thorndike and I.P. Pavlov established the basis
for modern learning theory. See id. at 81-102. The primary focus of the Associa-
tionists was cognitive learning and the stimulus-response model made famous by
Pavlov's classic work with animals. See id. at 96. Pavlov's best-known work involved
the salivation response in dogs. See id. Pavlov noticed that dogs salivate in the
presence of food. See id. He referred to the food as an "unconditioned stimulus"
and the salivation as an "unconditioned response." Id. Put simply, Pavlov used
these terms because he hypothesized that the response to food was native to the
dog and would have been present without any intervention. See id. Pavlov then
"conditioned" the dog to salivate in the absence of food by pairing the presenta-
tion of food with an unnatural stimulus, in this case, the sound of a ringing bell.
See id. The presentation of food coincided with the ringing of the bell. See id.
After a number of these trials, the food was not presented while the bell was rung.
See id. Even in the absence of food, the ringing caused the dog to salivate-the
dog had "learned" to associate the ringing of the bell with the presentation of
food. See id. Pavlov referred to the ringing as the "conditioned stimulus" and the
salivation that occurred after its presentation as the "conditioned response." Id.
In essence, he had created a learned behavior that was not native to the dog. See
id. This work required neither introspection nor self-report on the part of the
subject and allowed psychology to focus on observable behavior that could be em-
pirically analyzed. See id.
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tionalists. 65 Although both schools of thought relied on introspection as a
legitimate research methodology, the Structuralists studied only the con-
tent of the mind and were not concerned with practical applications, while
the Functionalists were more concerned with application over pure sci-
ence. 66 These concerns prompted the Structuralists to take an observa-
tional approach while the Functionalists de-emphasized observation in
favor of theoretical soundness. Despite this theoretical orientation, latter
day Functionalists began to realize the value of studying human behavior
without using introspection, and began to reevaluate the use of empiri-
cism and the objective study of behavior.6 7 Although this conceptual shift
eventually became known as Behaviorism, the original foundations were
clearly set in the Functionalist theoretical framework.
68
John B. Watson is credited with founding Behaviorism. 69 Watson's
work relied heavily on the efforts of earlier theorists who helped transform
65. See HERGENHAHN, supra note 27, at 335-36 (discussing criticism of Struc-
turalist and Functionalist use of introspection).
66. See id. at 335 (comparing Structuralism and Functionalism).
67. See id. at 336 (describing drift of Functionalism towards Behaviorism).
68. See id. (noting that convincing argument can be made that James Cattell
established Behaviorism approximately nine years before John B. Watson's "offi-
cial" founding of school of thought). Cattell's own words are informative:
I am not convinced that psychology should be limited to the study of
consciousness as such, insofar as this can be set off from the physical
world .... I admire the products of the Herbartian School and the ever-
increasing acuteness of introspective analysis from Locke to Ward. All
this forms an important chapter in modern psychology; but the scientific
results are small in quantity when compared with the objective experi-
mental work accomplished in the past fifty years. There is no conflict
between introspective analysis and objective experiment-on the con-
trary, they should and do continually cooperate. But the rather wide-
spread notion that there is no psychology apart from introspection is re-
futed by the brute argument of accomplished fact.
It seems to me that most of the research work that has been done by
me or in my laboratory is nearly as independent of introspection as work
in physics or in zoology. The time of mental processes, the accuracy of
perception and movement, the range of consciousness, fatigue and prac-
tise, the motor accompaniments of thought, memory, the association of
ideas, the perception of space, color-vision, preferences, judgments, indi-
vidual differences, the behavior of animals and children, these and other
topics I have investigated without requiring the slightest introspection on
the part of the subject or undertaking such on my own part during the
course of the experiments .... It is certainly difficult to penetrate by
analogy into the consciousness of the lower animals, of savages and of
children, but the study of their behavior has already yielded much and
promises much more.
Id. at 335.
69. See Diane F. DiClemente & Donald A. Hantula, John Broadus Watson, I/O
Psychologist, 37 INDUS.-ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOL. (Apr. 2000) (providing overview
of Watson's contributions to psychology), available at http://www.siop.org/tip/
backissues/TipApril00/7Diclemente.htm; see also Neel, supra note 13, at 107 (not-
ingJohn Watson's influence on development of Behaviorism).
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Functionalism into modern Behaviorism. 70 Watson came from a strong
empirical background, and, as a result, he hypothesized that there could
be a completely objective formulation of all psychological processes, in-
cluding consciousness. 7 1 It is fair to say that the overarching goal of Wat-
son's work was to establish psychology as a science based on observable
phenomena and then to free it from non-quantifiable concepts such as
consciousness and other mentalist concepts. 7 2 Watson believed this so
zealously that his theoretical orientation is often referred to as "objective
psychology."73 Objective might be too subtle a term for describing Wat-
son's theories, because he also believed that the study of psychology
should strive toward the goal of predicting and controlling behavior by
understanding environmental influences that effected the behavior of the
organism.7 4 Focusing on the organism as a whole, Watson limited his in-
quiries to observable behavior. 75 Accordingly, Watson rejected the use of
70. See HERGENHAHN, supra note 27, at 324-31 (discussing work of latter-day
Functionalist Edward L. Thorndike and Russian psychologist Ivan Petrovich
Pavlov). Using the stimulus response model, Thorndike established a number of
classical psychological principles known as the Law of Effect, the Law of Exercise
and the Law of Spread of Effect. See NEEL, supra note 13, at 90 (summarizing
Thorndike's theory of learning). The Law of Effect stands for the proposition that
rewarding behavior reinforces it, while punishment diminishes it. See id. The Law
of Exercise stands for the proposition that the repeated pairing of a stimulus and
response aids in learning but does not cause it. See id. The Law of Spread of Effect
stands for the proposition that responses occurring close together temporally are
strengthened through a process known as generalization. See id. Although Thorn-
dike was not concerned with consciousness, he contributed significantly to theories
of learning and the role of motivation in the learning process. See id. at 91 (sum-
marizing Thorndike's theory of learning). Similar to Thorndike, Pavlov hypothe-
sized that all mental events were the products of "reflex units of behavior." Id. at
95. His theoretical stance was slightly more extreme than Thorndike's, because
Pavlov asserted that all psychological constructs could be reduced to the study of
physiological processes. See id. at 102. Focusing on the principles of "brain excita-
tion and inhibition," Pavlov hypothesized that "reinforcement was necessary to es-
tablish a conditioned response." Id. Failure to reinforce a conditioned response
produced extinction of the conditioned response,just as a response could be gen-
eralized to stimulus that was similar to the original conditioned stimulus. See id.
71. SeeNEEL, supra note 13, at 107-08 (noting that much of Watson's work was
in opposition to continued efforts by Structuralists to impose their theoretical ori-
entation on psychology). Although Watson studied under the renowned British
empiricist A.W. Moore, history notes that the greatest influence on his theoretical
orientation came from the prominent Functionalist James Angell. See
HERGENHAHN, supra note 27, at 348 (discussing Watson's studies at University of
Chicago).
72. See NEEL, supra note 13, at 109 (noting that Watson defined psychology as
study of behavior and interaction with environment).
73. See HERGENHAHN, supra note 27, at 352 (noting that Watson found support
for his theories in Russian objective psychology characterized by work of Pavlov).
74. See NEEL, supra note 13, at 109 (noting that Watson's goal was "to free
psychology from leanings he believed to be unscientific").
75. See id. (noting that this approach encompassed neurological and physio-
logical responses of organism). This approach reduced Watson's study of behavior
to an organism's sensory receptors, its nervous system and its effectors. See id. (ex-
plaining variables of interest for studying behavior under Watson's approach).
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introspection as a methodological approach and also rejected the idea
that consciousness was responsible for behavior. 76 Conversely, Watson
proposed that consciousness "was merely a phenomenon that accompa-
nied certain physiological reactions caused by stimuli."77
This observational approach to the study of psychology provided
groundbreaking information that guided the discipline for years. 78 De-
spite these contributions, however, Watson did not achieve his overarch-
ing goal-the goal of redefining psychology as the study of observable
behavior. 79 Ironically, Watson's own theories were integrated into a new
school of thought represented by the Neobehaviorists.8 0 Using Behavior-
ist theories and logical positivism, the Neobehaviorists reintegrated psy-
chology and philosophy-clearly not a goal Watson would have
supported.81
The unexpected backlash of Watson's purely empirical approach was
a growing dissatisfaction with psychology's ability to predict human behav-
ior.8 2 Watson himself acknowledged that, although his research produced
76. See HERGENHAHN, supra note 27, at 352 (noting that Watson rejected all
conceptualizations of behavior based on mentalism). Watson conceptualized emo-
tion in the following manner: an organism is exposed to an environmental stimu-
lus, overt behavior occurs in reaction to the stimulus, and then the overt behavior
creates a visceral change, which is interpreted as emotion. See NEEL, supra note 13,
at 114 (explaining Watson's theory on origin of emotion). Consistently, Watson
interpreted personality as "the sum total of an individual's verbal, visceral, and
motor habits." Id. at 118.
77. HERGENHAHN, supra note 27, at 352 (comparing and contrasting Watson's
work with Russian contemporaries). Watson identified and focused on four main
types of behavior, into which all human behavior could be classified: explicit
(overt) learned behavior, such as talking and writing; implicit (covert) learned
behavior, such as increased arousal in stress-provoking situations; explicit un-
learned behavior, such as involuntary bodily responses like blinking; and implicit
unlearned behavior typified by biological processes. See id. at 353 (explaining how
Watson defined types of behavior and studied them). Because Watson shunned
mentalism, his research methodology was empirically driven and objective. See id.
Specifically, Watson used the four following methods for studying behavior: obser-
vation, the conditioned reflex method, testing of behavioral samples and verbal
reports that were treated as a form of behavior and not used as a means of studying
consciousness. See id.
78. See id. at 358-59 (explaining that Watson's work had lasting effects on psy-
chology, such as establishing "prediction and control of behavior" as major goal of
psychology).
79. See id. at 359 (explaining that few psychologists accepted Watson's view
that only "environment events and overt behavior" can explain behavior).
80. See id. at 373 (noting that Neobehaviorism dominated psychological
thought from 1930 to approximately 1950).
81. See id. at 372-92 (discussing theoretical evolution of Neobehaviorist the-
ory). For a discussion of behaviorist theories as applied to the therapeutic process,
see Daniel B. Fishman & Cyril M. Franks, Evolution and Differentiation Within Behav-
ior Therapy: A Theoretical and Epistemological Review, in HISTORY OF PSYCHOTHERAPY.
A CENTURY OF CHANGE 159 (Donald K. Freedheim ed., 1992), which explained the
"evolution of behavior therapy in terms of epistemology and theory."
82. See HERGENHAHN, supra note 27, at 370 (discussing how positivism influ-
enced Watson's theoretical orientation). Positivism, when applied to psychology,
[Vol. 46: p. 33
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valuable data, there were no overarching theoretical constructs that could
be used to explain and predict human behavior. 83 Enter logical positivism
and the Neobehaviorists.
Neobehaviorism has its roots in logical positivism. 84 Logical positiv-
ism is the blending of empirical and theoretical approaches to the study of
science, in this instance, psychology.8 5 This approach to the study of sci-
ence originated in the early twentieth century and first appeared in the
physical sciences, such as chemistry and physics. 86 Like psychology, the
physical sciences were working with theoretical constructs that were not
directly observable, such as gravity and the atom. 8 7 Scientists needed a
way to integrate theoretical speculation into their research while eliminat-
ing possible bias and remaining as objective as possible. 88 Logical positiv-
ism provided this framework. 89
Logical positivism split the scientific world into two realms, the empir-
ical and the theoretical. 90 Within these realms, empirical terms were ob-
servable events, while theoretical terms were the theoretical explanations
or underpinnings for explaining the observable events.9 ' Empiricism was
still important, and theories were only relevant if they explained the ob-
served phenomenon. 92 In order for psychology to apply this framework,
every abstract or theoretical construct had to be operationally defined.93 Put
simply, an operational definition allows an abstract term or concept to be
stands for the proposition that only the products, and not the products of the
mind, could be studied. See id. To proceed in any other manner would be to enter
the "forbidden realm of metaphysical speculation." Id.
83. See id. (stating that Watson's own research "often generated facts that ap-
peared to have no relationship among themselves").
84. See id. at 370-72 (discussing logical positivism, operationism and physical-
ism and their impact on Neobehaviorism).
85. See id. at 370-71 (noting that goal of strict empiricism was becoming
unrealistic).
86. See id. at 371 (noting that theoretical constructs were becoming
indispensable).
87. See id. (noting that theoretical constructs were becoming essential to un-
derstanding physical world).
88. See id. (noting that scientists needed to use "theory without encountering
the dangers inherent in metaphysical speculation").
89. See id. (discussing origins of logical positivism). History suggests that logi-
cal positivism came into being in 1924 when philosophers in Vienna created the
approach. See id. The logical positivists took the empirically based tenets of posi-
tivism and combined them with the structure of formal logic. See id. This combi-
nation allowed for theoretical underpinnings if the terms of such underpinnings
could be "logically tied to empirical observations." Id.
90. See id. (explaining that "[l]ogical positivism divided science").
91. See id. (explaining empirical and theoretical components of logical
positivism).
92. See id. (same).
93. See id. (noting that Harvard physicist Percy W. Bridgman proposed con-
cept of operational definition in 1927).
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defined in terms of the procedures used to measure the concept.94 For
example, the construct of anxiety, not directly observable by psychologists,
is usually operationally defined by conformance with accepted diagnostic
criteria or a score on a standardized assessment instrument.
95
Operationism, in conjunction with logical positivism, was the catalyst
for a new surge of intellectual growth and curiosity in psychology; in 1930,
psychology entered into its "age of theory."96 At the forefront of this age
of theory were the Neobehaviorists. 9 7 Although there were many different
schools of thought within Neobehaviorism, in general, this was the first
theoretical school since the Functionalists to reintegrate theory back into
psychology.98 Neobehaviorism demonstrated that theory and empiricism
could peacefully coexist in psychology.
9 9
94. See id. (noting that psychology must operationalize principles to be con-
sidered "a science on par with physics"). Operationism can be seen in the physical
sciences such as physics. See id. (explaining how physics operationalized concept
of force). For example, in physics, force equals mass times acceleration. See id.
Force can be operationally defined by procedures in determining the amount of
force present. See id.
95. See id. (explaining how to operationalize concepts, such as anxiety and test
scores).
96. See id. (describing new age of theory as psychology's first real attempt to
study complex forms of behavior while maintaining objectivity and limiting bias).
97. See id. at 371, 373 (noting that age of theory lasted from 1930 to 1950 and
Neobehaviorism dominated this period).
98. See id. at 372 (explaining that Neobehaviorism recaptured theory as inte-
gral to explaining behavior).
99. See id. (same). Although orientations within the school varied, all Ne-
obehaviorists appeared to accept certain general principles:
1. If theory was used, it must be used in ways demanded by logical
positivism.
2. All theoretical terms must be operationally defined.
3. Nonhuman animals should be used as research subjects for two
reasons:
(a) Relevant variables are easier to control than they are for human
subjects.
(b) Perceptual and learning processes occurring in nonhuman ani-
mals differ only in degree from those processes in humans; there-
fore, the information gained from nonhuman animals can be
generalized to humans.
4. The learning process is of prime importance because it is the primary
mechanism by which organisms adjust to changing environments.
Id. at 372-73.
Edward Chace Tolman was one of the most influential Neobehaviorists of his
time. See id. at 375 (noting that Tolman influenced Neobehaviorism by introduc-
ing concepts of purpose and cognition into approach). Tolman introduced the
concept of intervening variables as a means of understanding why certain behavior
occurred. See id. at 376-77. Unlike Watson, Tolman hypothesized that indepen-
dent variables (environmental events) gave rise to internal unobservable events
(intervening variables), which in turn led to behavior (dependent variables). See id.
at 377. Tolman's work had considerable influence on other prominent theorists
such as Albert Bandura, who pioneered the concepts of observational learning and
vicarious experience. See id. at 379 (explaining impact of Tolman's theoretical
stance). Building on Tolman's work, Clark Leonard Hull expanded the interven-
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At approximately the same time that Structuralism and Functionalism
were being questioned by the Behaviorists, Max Wertheimer founded the
school of thought known as Gestalt psychology. 100 As with many theories,
Gestalt psychology arose, in part, in response to the Structuralist and Be-
haviorist theories of the time.10 ' The Gestaltists were strongly opposed to
the Structuralist concept of breaking down human behavior into ele-
ments, preferring instead to conceptualize the human experience as a
whole.' 0 2 The Gestaltists also expressed strong opposition to the stimulus-
response model of behavior advocated by the Behaviorists because the
model attempted to reduce human consciousness down to elemental com-
ponents.10 3 Conceptually, the Gestaltists felt that the "whole of anything
was more than the sum of its parts," and this conceptual orientation pro-
vided the framework for theoretical investigations. 10 4
ing variable concept. See id. at 382 (explaining that Hull viewed physiological
events intervening between environmental experience and behavior, whereas Tol-
man viewed cognition as intervening variable). Burrhus Frederic Skinner, al-
though somewhat less concerned with theoretical underpinnings, clarified the
nature of the relationship between behavior and environmental stimuli. See id. at
387 (explaining Skinner's view of behavior and noting that his theoretical ap-
proach viewed behavior as interplay between environment contingencies). Most
notably, Skinner established the principle of operant conditioning and established
the framework for modern day behavior therapy. See id. at 387-90.
100. See id. at 397 (discussing origins of Gestalt psychology). Max Wertheimer
was a distinguished scholar in the field of psychology. See id. at 400 (noting Wert-
heimer's academic positions). He held numerous prestigious positions at the Uni-
versities of Prague, Vienna, Frankfurt and Berlin before immigrating to the United
States where he taught at the New School for Social Research in New York. See id.
Originally, Wertheimer pursued the study of law at the University of Prague before
shifting his focus to philosophy. See id.
History suggests that Max Wertheimer was vacation-bound on a train from
Vienna to the Rhineland when he conceptualized the foundations for Gestalt psy-
chology. See id. at 399. The main premise was that human perception was not
necessarily congruent with the experience of human sensation. See id. Wert-
heimer's initial exploration of this hypothesis took place in a hotel room with a toy
stroboscope. See id. He used the stroboscope to demonstrate that a human could
perceive motion when, in fact, none existed. See id. Building on this rudimentary
experiment, Wertheimer acquired more sophisticated equipment and discovered
what he later called the phi phenomenon. See id. at 399-400.
Flashing two lights successively, Wertheimer found that if the time be-
tween the flashes was long (200 milliseconds or longer), the observer per-
ceived two lights flashing on and off successively-which was, in fact, the
case. If the interval between flashes was very short (30 milliseconds or
less), both lights appeared to be on simultaneously. But if the interval
between flashes was about 60 milliseconds, it appeared that one light was
moving from one position to the other.
Id.
101. See id. at 397 (discussing origins of Gestalt psychology).
102. See id. (noting that Gestaltists opposed "elementalism in psychology").
103. See id. (noting that German term "Gestalt" means "form" or "whole").
104. See NEEL, supra note 13, at 322-23 (discussing Gestaltist methods of inves-
tigating psychological phenomenon); see also HERGENHAHN, supra note 27, at 398-
99 (discussing antecedents of Gestalt psychology). One Gestalt psychologist de-
scribed his opposition to an elemental approach to psychology as follows:
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Although the original work of Max Wertheimer focused on percep-
tual experiences, from a theoretical standpoint the Gestaltists quickly
turned to developing a general theory of human experience and behav-
ior. 10 5 The development of this theoretical orientation relied on intro-
spection, and the Gestaltists, although known for using empiricism when it
suited them, developed a reputation for creativity in research methodol-
ogy that at times flew in the face of past empirical approaches. 10 6 Mini-
mizing pure empiricism in favor of empirical flexibility and introspection,
the Gestaltists established the framework for the future development of
psychology in the United States and Europe-a framework that redirected
psychology from empiricism to a more flexible, theoretically and philo-
sophically driven approach that allowed a vast number of schools of
thought to flourish.
107
The perception itself shows a character of totality, a form, a Gestalt,
which in the very attempt at analysis is destroyed; and this experience, as
directly given, sets the problem for psychology. It is this experience that
presents the raw data which psychology must explain, and which it must
never be content to explain away. To begin with elements is to begin at
the wrong end; for elements are products of reflection and abstraction,
remotely derived from the immediate experience they are invoked to ex-
plain. Gestalt psychology attempts to get back to naive perception, to im-
mediate experience "undebauched by learning"; and it insists that it finds
there not assemblages of elements, but unified wholes; not masses of sen-
sations, but trees, clouds, and sky. And this assertion it invites anyone to
verify simply by opening his eyes and looking at the world about him in
his ordinary everyday way.
Id. at 397.
105. See NEEL, supra note 13, at 323 (noting that Gestaltists synthesized laws of
perception and applied them to human behavior). The basic principles of Gestalt
psychology focused on perceptual processes. For example, the principle of prox-
imity states that when stimuli are presented close together, they will be grouped
together as one perceptual unit by human perception. See HERGENHAHN, supra
note 27, at 408. Similarly, the principle of inclusiveness asserts that when. there is
more than one figure in the perceptual field, an individual is more likely to notice
the figure that contains the greater number of stimuli. See id. For a thorough
discussion of Gestaltist principles, see id. at 408-14; NEEL, supra note 13, at 323-27;
Max Wertheimer, Laws of Organization in Perceptual Forms, in A SOURCE BOOK OF
GESTALT PSYCHOLOGY 74 (Willis D. Ellis ed. & trans., 1938).
106. See NEEL, supra note 13, at 322 (noting "Gestaltists had no vested interest
in method ... and felt free to use or invent procedures as they were needed").
107. See id. at 331 (discussing impact of Gestalt psychology on modem schools
of psychological thought); see also HERGENHAHN, supra note 27, at 421 (same). Al-
though some critics note that Gestalt theories are experimentally untestable and
vague, the impact of Gestalt psychology on modern psychological theory is undeni-
able. See id. Michael Wertheimer, son of the venerable Max Wertheimer, de-
scribes the influence of Gestalt psychology on modern psychological thought in
the following manner:
The Gestalt movement played a significant role in the revolt against struc-
turalism. Its objections to elementism went beyond its critique of struc-
turalism... and were applied to [stimulus-response] behaviorism as well.
Gestalt psychology called attention to the usefulness of field concepts and
to various problems that might otherwise have been ignored, such as in-
sight in animals and humans, the organized nature of perception and of
[Vol. 46: p. 33
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The number of psychological schools of thought that have come into
existence over the last hundred years is remarkable, and a complete dis-
cussion is well beyond the scope of this Article. Some have gone the way
of the dinosaur while others still thrive today. Rarely is such a prolifera-
tion of diverse theoretical positions seen in other, more empirically based,
disciplines. Although operating under various names and theoretical ori-
entations, all share a common foundation that can be attributed to a drift
away from scientific empiricism and a strong reliance on philosophically
and theoretically driven approaches.
For example, who has not had at least a nodding acquaintance with
the work of Sigmund Freud, psychoanalysis, the Oedipus/Electra com-
plex, and the Id, Ego and Superego?1 8 One of the most influential theo-
rists in the history of psychology, Freud did not base his theories on
empirically observable phenomena, but rather on a complicated web of
unsubstantiated theoretical assumptions about the human conscious and
subconscious.10 9 Indeed, some would argue that Freud's biggest contribu
tion to the development of psychology was spurring on other psychologists
to prove him wrong.110 Freud's method of investigation was called free
association, where a patient was asked to report everything that came to
mind, regardless of its rationality or relevance to the topic at hand.'
experience, the richness of genuine thought processes, and to the utility
of dealing in larger, molar, organized units, taking full account of their
nature and structure ....
Although the Gestalt school no longer existed as a major self-con-
scious movement after the middle of the twentieth century, the issues it
raised in opposition to the prevalent oversimplified [stimulus-response]
psychology typical especially of American associationistic behaviorism
continued to be central in psychological thought. The Gestalt school had
done its job well, leaving a lasting mark on the discipline ....
Id. (citing MICHAEL WERTHEIMER, A BRIEF HISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGY 139-40 (3d ed.
1987)).
108. For a thorough discussion of Freud's work, see HERGENHAHN, supra note
27, at 453-81, and NEEL, supra note 13, at 225-54.
109. See HERGENHAHN, supra note 27, at 479-81 (discussing criticisms of and
contributions from Freudian psychoanalysis). See generally SIGMUND FREUD, THE IN-
TERPRETATION OF DREAMS (A.A. Brill trans., 1994) (explaining dreams and use of
dreams in therapy); SIGMUND FREUD, THE PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF EVERYDAY LIFE
(Alan Tyson trans., James Strachey ed., 1965) (explaining basis for everyday
human errors and mistakes); Sigmund Freud, The Origin and Development of Psychoa-
nalysis, 21 Am. J. PSYCHOL. 181-218 (1910) (explaining origins of psychoanalysis in
series of five lectures).
110. Cf HERGENHAHN, supra note 27, at 481 (explaining that "every personal-
ity theory since [Freud's] can be seen as a reaction to his theory or to some aspect
of it").
111. See NEEL, supra note 13, at 226-27 (discussing evolution of Freud's investi-
gational methodology). Initially, Freud used hypnosis to help patients recall trau-
matic experiences. See id. at 226. Given that hypnosis was marginally effective at
best, Freud turned to simply having the patients recount their experiences without
the use of hypnosis. See id. at 227. This technique, in conjunction with dream
analysis, became the basis for free association. See id.
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Freud also relied heavily on dream interpretation. 1 2 In these ap-
proaches, a trained analyst listened to observations and interpreted them,
producing a series of interrelated associations.' 13 Freud hypothesized that
these associations were responsible for feelings, impulses, ideas and, even-
tually, psychopathology.' 1 4 Freud conceptualized the human being as he-
donistic and sexually motivated, and at the core of these associations was
the individual's intent to maximize pleasure and minimize pain.' 15
Freud was also the first theorist to hypothesize about the presence of
an unconscious mind.1 16 The conscious mind was at work when the individ-
ual had an awareness of what was taking place, while the subconscious
mind could be at work without the individual being aware of it.1 17 To
explain these processes, Freud conceptualized the human psychic process
as a theoretical three-part personality structure consisting of the Id, Ego
and Superego."18 The Id represented an individual's primitive biological
drives, while the Ego was responsible for finding socially appropriate out-
lets for these impulses.1 19 The Superego represented the individual's
moral values and ethics, and therefore regulated the interaction of the Id
and the Ego. 120 Each of these aspects of personality influenced an individ-
ual's experience of consciousness and the individual's ability to interact in
the environment. 121
Although these theories have had a significant impact on the develop-
ment of psychology and have stimulated considerable intellectual debate,
most of Freud's concepts were vague and undefined to the point of being
nebulous and unverifiable. 122 His approach flew directly in the face of
112. See id. at 234 (noting Freud's use of dream work during therapy to un-
cover "unconscious forces at the base of personal problems").
113. See id. at 228 (discussing process of psychoanalysis).
114. See id. (discussing internal conflicts and evolution of psychopathology or
maladjustment in Freudian theory).
115. See id. at 227 (summarizing basic tenets of Freudian theory and noting
Freud's emphasis on sexual conflict). Freud's psychosexual stages of development
focused on the human body's erogenous zones as a sexual source of pleasure and
consisted of five stages. See HERGENRAHN, supra note 27, at 475-77 (noting that
Freud theorized that foundations for adult personality formed by age five).
116. See NEEL, supra note 13, at 230-31 (discussing Freud's conceptualization
of conscious and unconscious mind).
117. See id. (same).
118. For a comprehensive discussion of the Id, Ego and Superego, see
HERGENHAHN, supra note 27, at 470-73, and NEEL, supra note 13, at 230-31.
119. See HERGENHAHN, supra note 27, at 471 (noting that Id represents human
instincts and drives, and is part of unconscious mind, whereas Ego satisfies instincts
and drives by matching them with real objects in physical environment).
120. See id. at 472 (noting that Superego is "moral arm of the personality").
121. See id. at 471-73 (describing how Id, Ego and Superego influence individ-
ual's behavior).
122. See NEEL, supra note 13, at 250-51 (noting that Freud did not tolerate
questioning of his ideas and that "dogmatic acceptance" of his concepts was re-
quired even though such orientation is incompatible with science). The praise
and criticisms of Freud's work are numerous. See id. at 249-51 (discussing criti-
[Vol. 46: p. 33
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empiricism, marked the end of Structuralism and sanctioned the use of
intuition and unsupported speculation in the development of psychologi-
cal theory-a trend evident even today. 123 From this unempirical founda-
tion sprang a wealth of psychological schools of thought.124 In the
tradition of Freud's work, these schools of thought did not focus on strict
observation, emphasizing the importance of theoretical development and
concepts. 125 For example, Carl Jung, once a follower of Freud, developed
concepts of psychological archetypes and the "collective unconscious" af-
cisms of Freudian theory); see also HERGENHAHN, supra note 27, at 479-80 (same).
Critics tend to focus on the breadth of Freud's theories and the lack of empirical
foundations for their existence. See id. (discussing common criticisms). First, crit-
ics note that Freud's theories were based on limited observations of his own pa-
tients. See id. at 479. Accordingly, these patients were probably not representative
of the population at large. See id. In addition, Freud did not confirm his observa-
tions with others, and, as a result, probably biased these observations with his own
expectations. See id. Second, critics point out that Freud's theories and definitions
could not be measured because they could not be operationally defined. See id.
Third, Freud was intolerant and dogmatic to the point that competing ideas were
dismissed out of hand along with the individuals who proposed them. See id. at
480. Fourth, Freud's theories relied heavily, and some would say inappropriately,
on sexual energy as motivation for human behavior. See id.
Despite these criticisms, Freud's work was essential to the growth of modern
psychology and psychiatry. See HERGENHAHN, supra note 27, at 480-81 (explaining
Freud's contributions to psychology). First, Freud was the first to theorize about
unconscious motivation and formulated the first comprehensive theory of person-
ality formation. See id. Second, Freud provided the first basis for understanding
both normal and abnormal behavior while laying the foundations for psychoana-
lytic treatment. See id. at 481. Finally, Freud's theories allowed for the application
of psychology to a wide variety of human experiences such as religion and inter-
personal relations. See id. One commentator described Freud's contributions in
the following manner:
Whenever the Freudian theories have been accepted outside the psycho-
analytic fold, they have been received not because they carry the creden-
tials of exact, verifiable evidence, but because they aroused conviction as
convictions are aroused in everyday life-by the feeling that they re-
present keen observation and shrewd speculation which, in the main,
square with the facts.
It is enlightening to compare psychoanalytic psychology with struc-
turalism, in this respect its antithesis. Structuralism, equipped with a
highly developed scientific method, and refusing to deal with materials
not amenable to that method, admirably illustrates the demand for exact-
ness and correctness by which science disciplines untutored curiosity. Psy-
choanalysis, with its seemingly inexhaustible curiosity.., lacks the means,
and apparently... the inclination, to check its exuberant speculation by
severely critical tests. But what it lacks in correctness, it gains in vitality, in
the comprehensiveness of its view, and in the closeness of its problems to
the concerns of everyday life.
Id.
123. See HERGENHAHN, supra note 27, at 481 (explaining that psychoanalysis
thrives today, while Structuralism has faded from psychology, possibly because psy-
choanalysis incorporates intuition).
124. See id. at 481-91 (discussing alternative theories developed in response to
psychoanalysis).
125. See id. (discussing alternative theories built upon Freudian concepts).
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ter breaking with Freud's conceptualization and, more specifically, over-
sexualization of human personality.126 Like Freud's ideasJung's concepts
and theories were not empirically driven or verifiable. At times, Jung's
theories were so theoretical and unverifiable that he has been criticized as
being a man less of science than of mysticism and, possibly, occultism.127
Jung is also credited with introducing the concept of "self-actualiza-
tion" into the discipline of psychology, which, in turn, provided the foun-
dation for therapeutic treatment and many humanistically and
existentially oriented schools of psychological thought.1 2 8 In fact, Freud
and Jung often are credited with being pioneers in the area of applying
psychological theory to the actual treatment of patients. 129  Because
Freud's andJung's theoretical positions and conceptualizations of person-
ality and its dysfunction were far from empirically driven and verifiable, it
is not surprising that the development of evolving therapeutic interven-
tions and psychological thought took on a strong philosophical, unempiri-
cal bent.130
With Freud, the emphasis in psychology began to encompass the
treatment of the mentally ill, and humanistic, existential and individual
psychology began to flourish. 13 1 The collection of these psychologies is
sometimes referred to as "third-force psychology," but for the purposes of
126. See id. at 482-85 (discussing Jung's major theoretical concepts). Unlike
Freud's conceptualization of sexual motivation, Jung conceptualized the uncon-
scious as a "storage house for all the past experiences and conflicts that man had
undergone, all his folk wisdom, his yearnings, his misalliances, his struggles with
nature." NEEL, supra note 13, at 263. Jung's concept of the collective unconscious
posited that human beings shared common experiences and emotional responses
that were inherited as predispositions called archetypes. See HERGENHAHN, supra
note 27, at 483 (noting that "collective unconscious was Jung's most mystical and
controversial concept and his most important"). Genetically represented, these
archetypes were present in the form of symbols and found expression in abstract
vehicles such as dreams, philosophy and religion. See NEEL, supra note 13, at 263-
64. Jung was also known for his conceptualization of personality in terms of extro-
version and introversion. See id. at 271.
127. See HERGENHAHN, supra note 27, at 485 (noting thatJung's theories have
been criticized as being "unclear, incomprehensible, inconsistent, and, in places,
contradictory").
128. See id. (discussing Jung's contributions to psychology).
129. For a general discussion of psychoanalytic theories of psychotherapy, see
Morris N. Eagle & David L. Wolitzky, Psychoanalytic Theories of Psychotherapy, in His-
TORY OF PSYCHOTHERAPY: A CENTURY OF CHANGE, supra note 81, at 109-58.
130. See NEEL, supra note 13, at 269-70 (explaining criticisms of Jung's theory
and noting that, despite its lack of empiricism, Jung's theory thrives possibly be-
cause it incorporates facets of psychotherapy deemed "sacred," such as
psychoanalysis).
131. For a general discussion of the various forms of humanistic and existen-
tial psychologies, see HERGENHAHN, supra note 27, at 499-524. Existential psychol-
ogy has its roots in early Greek philosophy. See id. at 502. Martin Heidegger is
credited with bridging the gap between existential philosophy and psychology. See
id. at 503. Heidegger's basic premise was that a person and the world that they
exist in are inseparable. See id. Accordingly, the human mind is responsible for
bringing reality into existence. See id. Another important aspect of Heidegger's
[Vol. 46: p. 33
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this Article will be referred to as Humanistic psychology.1 3 2 Humanistic
psychology evolved in direct response to dissatisfaction with the theories of
Behaviorism and psychoanalysis. 133 Humanists asserted that pure science
was not an adequate vehicle for understanding human behavior.1 34 Spe-
cifically, Humanistic psychology criticized Behaviorism because it "likened
humans to robots, lower animals, or computers."1 3 5 Likewise, Humanistic
psychology criticized psychoanalysis because it "concentrated mainly on
emotionally disturbed people and on developing techniques for making
abnormal people normal."136 Accordingly, the emphasis of Humanistic
theory was that human beings were dynamic and exist to change and develop. See
id.
Abraham Maslow is generally credited with founding Humanistic psychology.
See id. at 508. Humanistic psychology rejects Behaviorism and the scientific
method, and focuses on the following tenets:
1. Little of value can be learned about humans by studying nonhuman
animals.
2. Subjective reality is the primary guide for human behavior.
3. Studying individuals is more informative than studying what groups of
individuals have in common.
4. A major effort should be made to discover those things that expand
and enrich human experience.
5. Research should seek information that will help solve human
problems.
6. The goal of psychology should be to formulate a complete description
of what it means to be a human being. Such a description would in-
clude the importance of language, the valuing process, the full range
of human emotions, and the ways humans seek and attain meaning in
their lives.
Id. at 510. Because humans are much more complex than physical objects, the
humanists felt that the methods of science were inapplicable to the study of
human behavior and mental illness. See id. (explaining that Humanistic psychol-
ogy rejects "goal of predicting and controlling human behavior, while so many
scientifically inclined psychologists accept"). Maslow's theories mirrored this ap-
proach and established the foundation for his well known concepts of the hierar-
chy of needs and self-actualization. See id. at 511-12. Maslow theorized that human
needs could be arranged in a hierarchy. See id. at 511. Human needs progressed
from primitive physiological needs to higher order esteem, love and belonging
needs. See id. Only when the more primitive needs were satisfied could an individ-
ual address the next higher order need. See id. Individuals who satisfied these
needs reached self-actualization, or "one's full, human potential." Id. Maslow's
theories laid the groundwork for the development of a number of humanistically
based psychotherapies. See id. at 513-20 (discussing work of Carl Rogers and
George Kelly).
132. See id. at 501 (noting that third-force psychology includes Humanistic
psychology, which combines romanticism and existentialism).
133. See id. at 500 (emphasizing importance of individual human attributes
that Behaviorism and psychoanalysis ignored).
134. See id. (explaining that psychology must establish new "human science").
The Humanists believed that this new science "would study humans as aware,
choosing, valuing, emotional, and unique beings in the universe. Traditional sci-
ence does not do this and must therefore be rejected." Id.
135. Id. (noting that automatistic nature of behaviorism was humanistic psy-
chology's major argument against behaviorism).
136. Id.
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psychology was to make already mentally healthy individuals healthier.
137
More specifically, Humanistic psychology rejected science and operated
from the theoretical position that the primary focus of any psychological
model should be the uniqueness and positive aspects of each individ-
ual.' 3 8 Although Humanistic psychology contributed significantly to the
development of many client-centered psychotherapies, it has been criti-
cized for dismissing the contributions of science to psychology and for
sending the discipline on a course reminiscent of its "prescientific
past."' 3 9
137. See id. (explaining that third-force psychology attempted to provide in-
formation to healthy persons rather than focus solely on abnormal persons).
138. See id. (explaining Humanistic psychology's focus on helping people
"reach their full potential"); see also Laura N. Rice & Leslie S. Greenberg, Humanis-
tic Approaches to Psychotherapy, in HISTORY OF PSYCHOTHERAPY: A CENTURY OF
CHANGE, supra note 81, at 197-99 (noting that all humanistic therapies share princi-
ples that differentiate them from other major orientations and explaining core
beliefs of humanistic psychology). For a seminal work in Humanistic psychology,
see Carl R. Rogers, Significant Aspects of Client-Centered Therapy, 1 Am. PSYCHOL. 415,
415-22 (1946).
139. See HERGENHAHN, supra note 27, at 523 (explaining criticisms of Human-
istic psychology). The criticisms of Humanistic psychology are numerous, with
most focusing on the lack of scientific underpinnings for its theoretical base. See
id. at 523. One commentator noted the following specific criticisms:
1. Humanistic psychology equates behaviorism with the work of Watson
and Skinner. Both men stressed environmental events as the causes of
human behavior and denied or minimized the importance of mental
events. Other behaviorists, however, stress both mental events and
purpose in their analysis of behavior ....
2. [Humanistic psychology] overlooks the cumulative nature of science
by insisting that scientific psychology does not care about the loftier
human attributes. The problem is that we are not yet prepared to
study such attributes. One must first learn a language before one can
compose poetry. The type of scientific psychology that humanistic psy-
chologists criticize provides the basis for the future study of more com-
plex human characteristics.
3. The description of humans that humanistic psychologists offer is like
the more favorable ones found through the centuries in poetry, litera-
ture, or religion. It represents a type of wishful thinking that is not
supported by the facts that more objective psychology has accumu-
lated....
5. If humanistic psychology rejects scientific method as a means of evalu-
ating propositions about humans, what is to be used in its place? If
intuition or reasoning alone is to be used, this enterprise should not
be referred to as psychology but would be more accurately labeled phi-
losophy or even religion. The humanistic approach to studying
humans is often characterized as a throwback to psychology's prescien-
tific past.
6. By rejecting animal research, humanistic psychologists are turning
their backs on an extremely valuable source of knowledge about
humans. Not to use the insights of evolutionary theory in studying
human behavior is, at best, regressive.
7. Many of the terms and concepts that humanistic psychologists use are
so nebulous that they defy clear definition and verification....
Id. at 522-23.
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IV. PSYCHOLOGY TODAY
The historical context set forth above provides the basis for viewing
contemporary psychology-a discipline that is still struggling with the phi-
losophy versus science question. 140 This theoretical impasse has allowed
contemporary psychology to become an incredibly diverse field, the major
theoretical orientation of which might best be described as "eclectic." 141
A cynic might note that eclecticism is shorthand for a complete and total
lack of consensus or direction. This diversity is evident in the fact that the
American Psychological Association lists forty-seven separate divisions of
psychology.142 This diversity also is evident in the education and training
of clinical psychologists, the psychologists involved primarily with patient
care. 143 Although psychology has turned to more contemporary ap-
proaches for the study of human behavior and the treatment of mental
illness such as information processing, cognitive psychology and genetic
influences on personality, the status of psychology is still far from that of a
science. 144
At this point, psychology is still struggling to find an identity. As a
result, the discipline finds itself in limbo between pure philosophy and
hard science. 145 Further confounding the problem is the existence of dis-
agreement among and within psychological schools of thought. 146 This
can still be attributed directly to the continued existence of the age-old
battle between the scientific empiricists and the theoretical philoso-
phers. 147 Although it appears that the battle will never be resolved from
140. See id. at 531 (noting that contemporary psychology reflects remnants of
almost every school of psychological thought).
141. See id. at 532 (explaining that eclectic view of modern psychology allows
diverse views to coexist peacefully without relying on schools of psychological
thought and permits psychologist to choose "most effective" approach to handle
specific problems).
142. See id. at 532-34 (listing divisions of American Psychological Association
and explaining its diversity). The diversity and specificity represented by this list is
informative in that it reflects the influence of historical antecedents on the devel-
opment of the discipline. Some relevant division examples include: General Psy-
chology, Teaching of Psychology, Experimental Psychology, Psychology and the
Arts, Clinical Psychology, Military Psychology, Theoretical and Philosophical Psy-
chology, History of Psychology, Psychotherapy, Psychological Hypnosis, Psychology
of Women, and Exercise and Sports Psychology. See id. at 533-34.
143. See id. at 534-35 (discussing different training options for clinical
psychologists).
144. See id. at 535-52 (discussing decline of radical behaviorism and rise of
contemporary cognitive psychology and psychology's current status as science).
145. See id. at 551-55 (explaining psychology's status as science and how disci-
pline differentiates between "philosophy that emphasizes rationalism" and "philos-
ophy that emphasizes empiricism").
146. See id. at 553-54 (noting that different divisions of American Psychologi-
cal Association, which represent different psychological schools of thought, are
more empirically oriented than others).
147. See id. at 554 (noting differences in divisions render some more "scientif-
ically oriented" and others more "humanistically oriented").
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within the discipline itself, a new force has appeared in recent years that
threatens to settle the issue once and for all. 148 This force is managed
care, and its emphasis on fiscal responsibility and empirically validated
treatment approaches strongly favors the forces of empiricism. 1 49
A. Psychotherapy and the Evolution of Empirically Validated Treatments
Clinical psychology, which is concerned primarily with the diagnosis
and treatment of mental illness, has followed a course of development sim-
ilar to that of the field of psychology generally-one marked by differing
theoretical approaches, methodological approaches, diagnostic tech-
niques and treatment formulations. 1 50 Early explanations of mental ill-
ness were far from comprehensive and ranged from primitive medical and
psychological models to supernatural causes.' 5 1 Early treatments for
mental illness were just as haphazard and driven by ignorance as they were
based on whatever model of mental illness was in vogue at the time.152
For example, during the Middle Ages, mental illness was attributed to un-
known and possibly evil forces entering the body.153 Accordingly, the ap-
propriate cure was to remove these forces, usually through the use of
148. See Michael J. Lambert & Allen E. Bergin, Achievements and Limitations of
Psychotherapy Research, in HISTORY OF PSYCHOTHERAPY: A CENTURY OF CHANGE, supra
note 81, at 368-70 (discussing "equal outcomes phenomenon" in context of psy-
chotherapy). The equal outcomes phenomenon refers to the assertion that there
are no significant differences between various forms of therapy and treatment out-
come. See id. at 368-69. Despite this assertion, there is a growing body of research
affirming that behavioral and cognitive methods appear to consistently improve
treatment efficacy above and beyond other treatment modalities. See id. at 369.
Other explanations are offered for the equal outcomes phenomenon: "(a)
[d]ifferent therapies can achieve similar goals through different processes; (b) dif-
ferent outcomes do occur but are not detected by past research strategies; and (c)
different therapies embody common factors that are curative although not empha-
sized by the theory of change central to a particular school." Id. Another salient
factor is the presence of sloppy research design and methodology in psychother-
apy outcome studies. See id. at 370 (citing Alan E. Kazdin & Debra Bass, Power to
Detect Differences Between Alternative Treatments in Comparative Psychotherapy Outcome
Research, 57 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 138, 138-47 (1989)).
149. Cf Jesse A. Goldner, Managed Care and Mental Health: Clinical Perspectives
and Legal Realities, 35 Hous. L. REv. 1437, 1448 (1999) (noting that managed care
programs aim "to provide services more effectively and efficiently," suggesting that
programs will prefer therapeutic techniques and approaches validated as effective
through empirical means).
150. SeeJOHN M. REISMAN, A HISTORY OF CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 1-2 (1976) (de-
fining clinical psychology as "a branch of psychology devoted to the search for, and
the application of, psychological principles and techniques that contribute to the
understanding of individuals and that may be used to promote their more effective
functioning"). See generally id. (discussing development of clinical psychology).
151. See HERGENHAHN, supra note 27, at 428-35 (discussing witch-hunts, suc-
cubi, incubi, chipping of holes in skulls to release demons and bleeding).
152. See id. at 429-33 (discussing natural law, magic and four humors as treat-
ment modalities for mental illness).
153. See id. at 429 (noting that supernatural explanations for illness existed
until work of early Greek physicians such as Hippocrates).
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exorcism and magical ritual.1 5 4 Primitive psychological approaches fo-
cused on purging the mind of primitive disturbing emotions through a
variety of methods including reenactment, love and reassurance. 15 5 Early
biological approaches attributed mental illness to organic causes such as
inherited traits or physiological imbalances, and treatments included
bleeding and the ingestion of certain foods. 15 6
This poor understanding of the etiology of mental illness caused the
mentally ill to be vilified and poorly treated until the end of the nine-
teenth century. 157 In 1883, psychologists made the first attempts to cate-
gorize all known forms of mental illness, to explain the origins of these
mental illnesses and to set forth how these disorders should be treated.1 58
Although these attempts were primitive at best, they helped bring the con-
cept of mental illness out of the dark ages and laid the foundation for later
theorists who specialized in the diagnosis and treatment of mental
illness. 159
154. See id. (noting that supernatural model of mental illness was very popular
during Middle Ages).
155. See id. at 430-31 (applying natural law to understanding of mental ill-
ness). The eighteenth century concept of natural law, when applied to psychology,
suggests that mental illness was a consequence of an individual's behavior. See id.
at 430 (describing natural law beliefs whereby treatment required changing of
ways). For example, sinful behavior would be punished with mental illness, while
good behavior would be rewarded by success and health. See id. at 430-31 (citing
B.A. Maher & W.B. Maher, Psychopathology: II. From the Eighteenth Century to Modern
Times, in Topics in the History of Psychology 303 (G.A. Kimble & K. Schlesinger
eds., 1985)).
156. See id. at 432-33 (discussing biological approaches dating back to 3000
B.C.).
157. See id. at 432 (noting that many believed God inflicted mental illness
upon people for impiety). The mentally ill during the Middle Ages and the Ren-
aissance were very poorly treated, and many people during these times believed
that what we would now classify as mental illness was conclusive proof of an individ-
ual being a witch or the victim of possession. See id. at 434. These people also
believed that "sinful" individuals were more susceptible than "good" individuals to
possession and witchcraft and that women were more susceptible to evil and witch-
ery. See id. The lucky mentally ill were locked up in asylums, while the more unfor-
tunate were burned at the stake. See id. at 435. Because the mentally ill were
treated like animals in these asylums, perhaps burning was the more merciful end.
See id. (noting that mentally ill were "chained, beaten, fed only enough to remain
alive, subjected to bloodletting, and put on public display for visitors"). Many psy-
chologists and humanitarians worked to improve the plight of the mentally ill. See
id. at 435-48 (noting work of Philippus Paracelsus, Cornelius Agrippa, Johann
Weyer, Felix Plater, Philippe Pinel, Joseph Daquin, Benjamin Rush, Dorethea Dix,
Emil Kraepelin and Lightner Witmer).
158. See id. at 439 (discussing contribution of Emil Kraeplin). Kraeplin's sys-
tem classified mental disorders based on their causes, involvement of the brain and
nervous system, symptoms and treatment. See id. His classification system brought
structure to diagnosis and treatment in the fledgling and, at times, nebulous, field
of clinical psychology. See id. (noting impact of system).
159. See id. at 43548 (discussing early approaches to treatment of mental ill-
ness). In 1896, Lightner Witmer established the world's first psychological clinic
dedicated to treating people with mental illness. See id. at 440-42 (noting that Wit-
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Compared to early explanations for and treatment of mental illness,
the field of psychology has come a long way. Originally, psychologists were
concerned only with studying observable phenomena, as exemplified by
the Structuralists. Because early theorists had no understanding of the
covert underlying mechanisms of abnormal behavior, treatment was not
possible or practical. Similarly, the complete inability to understand the
intricacies/ workings of the human mind forced early treating psycholo-
gists to adopt a philosophical approach to conceptualization and treat-
ment. Early explanations of mental illness reflected this lack of
understanding. With the theories of Freud came the expansion of psy-
chology into the treatment realm. Today, the diagnosis and treatment of
mental illness is as common as going to a medical doctor for a physical
ailment. Although identification, awareness and treatment of mental ill-
ness are common today, even the most "advanced" and modern forms of
psychotherapy are, at least in part, philosophically and not empirically
based.] 60 Ironically, many of these non-empirically based theoretical posi-
tions provided the basis for many of today's modern psychotherapies.
This theoretical/philosophical orientation has spawned a large num-
ber of treatment orientations and approaches, and there is no single
agreed-upon method within the discipline for treating a particular disor-
der. 16 1 This variation is reflected in the fact that there is no generally
mer is credited with coining term clinical psychology). In addition to establishing
the first true clinical treatment facility, Witmer also developed the first training
curriculum for clinical psychologists and the first scholarlyjournal devoted entirely
to the subject. See id. (noting that Witmer's establishment of school and journal
stemmed from his formal training as experimental psychologist, which made him
very critical of unscientific approaches to psychology). For a discussion of Wit-
mer's conceptualization of clinical psychology, see Lightner Witmer, Clinical Psy-
chology, 1 PSYCHOL. CLINIC 1 (1907).
160. See generally RAYMOND J. CORSINI & DANNY WEDDING, CURRENT PSYCHO-
THERAPIES (3d ed. 1984) (discussing modern psychotherapies). Today, there are
over 250 different systems of psychotherapy. See id. at 7. The major systems in-
clude: Psychoanalysis (derived from the work of Sigmund Freud); Adlerian Psycho-
therapy (focusing on moving an individual toward fictional goals in phenomenal
field while eliminating feelings of inferiority); Analytical Psychotherapy (creating
dialectical relationship between conscious and unconscious via self-regulating sys-
tem); Person-Centered Psychotherapy (focusing on self-growth and conflict resolu-
tion); Rational-Emotive Therapy (focusing on how emotional consequences are
created by individual's belief system); Behavior Therapy (applying modern learn-
ing theory to treatment of psychopathology); Cognitive Therapy (based on theory
of personality which maintains that how one thinks and feels largely determines
how one feels and behaves); Gestalt Therapy (phenomenological-existential ther-
apy where perceiving, feeling and acting are distinguished from interpreting and
reshuffling preexisting attitudes); Existential Psychotherapy (exploring nature of
human existence); Transactional Analysis (focusing on three active, dynamic and
observable ego states); Family Therapy (focusing on functioning of whole family
unit rather than individual); and Multimodal Therapy (integrated system dealing
with sensory, imagery, cognitive and interpersonal factors and their interactive ef-
fects). See id. at 19-545 (listing and discussing theories).
161. See generally id. (discussing various forms of systemic psychotherapy).
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accepted definition of psychotherapy.' 62 Because there is no generally ac-
cepted definition, there is also little consensus regarding treatment ap-
proaches. Some of the theories and treatment approaches are accepted as
effective even when there is no empirical evidence to support them, while
others border on taking the discipline back to the Middle Ages when the
burning of the mentally ill was in vogue. Some treatment modalities are
so bizarre that one might argue that the psychotherapist is practicing
witchcraft. 16 3 We laugh at these unorthodox and absurd approaches be-
cause, even at a common sense level, it is hard to believe either that they
possess any therapeutic value or that anyone would believe that they do.
Despite this, many unusual treatments with questionable effectiveness con-
tinue to thrive and are still very much a part of the psychological
landscape. 1 6
4
162. See id. at 1 (noting that "psychotherapy cannot be defined with any preci-
sion"). Corsini provides the following general definition:
Psychotherapy is a formal process of interaction between two parties,
each party usually consisting of one person but with the possibility that
there may be two or more people in each party, for the purpose of ame-
lioration of one of the two parties relative to any of the following areas of
disability or malfunction or any combination thereof: cognitive functions
(disorders of thinking), affective functions (suffering or emotional dis-
comforts), or behavioral functions (inadequacy of behavior), with the
treatment party having some theory of personality's origins, develop-
ment, maintenance and change and some modality of treatment logically
related to the theory, with the treatment party generally having profes-
sional and legal approval to act as a therapist.
Id. Similarly, Webster's Collegiate Dictionary defines psychotherapy as the
"[t] reatment of mental or emotional disorder or of related bodily ills by psycholog-
ical means." WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 943 (10th ed. 1993).
163. See CORSINI & WEDDING, supra note 160, at 1 (discussing unusual forms of
psychotherapy). Some forms of therapy are truly bizarre. For example, there are
systems where no therapist is needed or where the therapist does nothing, which
makes one wonder why a therapist is needed at all. See id. (citing Ernst
Schmidhofer, Mechanical Group Therapy, 115 Sci. 120, 120-23 (1952), andJ. BION,
THERAPEUTIC SOCIAL CLUBS (1948)). Other methods symbolically rebirth the pa-
tient, while others make fun of the patients, treating them with ridicule and disre-
spect. See id. (citing Paul Bindrim, Aqua-Energetics, in HANDBOOK OF INNOVATIVE
PSYCHOTHERAPIES 32 (Raymond J. Corsini ed., 1981) and Frank Farrelly & Jeff
Brandsma, PROVOCATIVE THERAPY (1974)).
164. See id. at 8 (discussing ideological enclaves). Like many philosophically
based disciplines, psychology can be theoretically incestuous. One commentator
refers to schools of psychological thought as "ideological enclaves," where "people
who believe that they have the right, the final, the complete, and the only answer-
and that all other systems [or theories] are incomplete, tentative, weak, or simply
mistaken." Id. Further,
[p]eople within these enclaves (better known as schools of therapy) tend
to communicate mostly with others they meet at conventions; they read
each other's writings, and they tend over time to develop specialized vo-
cabularies. They reinforce one another by recounting their successes
with the clients of people of different persuasions .... "proving" to one
another the superiority of their way of thinking and acting.
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In fact, it is not only bizarre therapies that survive. Many "main-
stream" treatments continue to thrive despite a lack of empirical valida-
tion. We accept at face value that the theories underlying them have some
basis in reality and are effective at some, perhaps immeasurable, level.
Part of the reason that these ideologies and theories continue to exist
without being tested is that the discipline has, until recently, been unwill-
ing to become more of a science and less of a theoretically driven philoso-
phy. This is not to say that theory is not an integral part of psychology. 16 5
Theory has been, and probably always will be, an integral part of better
understanding and conceptualizing human behavior. In our modern en-
vironment, however, theory alone may no longer be good enough. Finan-
cial concerns in the form of managed care have changed the landscape for
the foreseeable future.
Only empirically supported interventions will be allowed to survive in
the future. To adapt, the discipline must become more scientific and base
treatment on empirically supported interventions. Although many in the
psychological community will find the last statement appalling, and criti-
cize it as being unrealistic, there is a parallel from another discipline sup-
porting the need for this approach. Specifically, the discipline of
medicine evolved in a similar fashion, and today has left its philosophical
roots in the past in order to pursue the study of medicine on an empirical
level. In order to survive in today's financial and legal environment, psy-
chology must do the same or face extinction.
In addition to the ebb and flow of history set forth above, the develop-
ment of psychology and psychotherapy has also been subject to economic,
political and environmental influences.1 66 Economic factors such as gov-
ernment involvement and insurance reimbursement are critical to keep-
ing the mental health profession alive and thriving. 16 7 Similarly,
environmental factors-such as the environment where psychotherapy is
practiced-have a direct effect on the development of therapeutic models
and schools of thought.168 Political and social advocacy can also have an
165. See generally Henry E. Adams, The Relevance of Psychological Theories to Stan-
dards of Practice, in SCIENTIFIC STANDARDS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL PRACTICE, supra note 2,
at 251 (discussing advantages and disadvantages of theory driven approaches to
psychotherapy); Patrick M. Ghezzi, Science, Theory, and Practice, in SCIENTIFIC STAN-
DARDS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL PRACTICE, supra note 2, at 261 (discussing importance of
science in practice of applied psychology).
166. See generally Gary R. Vandenbos et al., A Century of Psychotherapy: Economic
and Environmental Influences, in HISTORY OF PSYCHOTHERAPY- A CENTURY OF
CHANGE, supra note 81, at 65 (discussing variety of settings in which psychothera-
pists have practiced).
167. See id. at 97 (noting that government support and insurance reimburse-
ment provided by Medicare, Medicaid and private health insurance plans has
played instrumental role in advancing discipline of psychology).
168. See id. at 67-96 (discussing impact of therapeutic environments). For ex-
ample, the mental health clinics of the 1920s were psychoanalytic in orientation.
See id. at 67 (noting Freud's establishment of psychoanalysis precursor to scientifi-
cally oriented psychotherapy). These early clinics were responsible for populariz-
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impact on the evolution of the discipline by keeping policymakers in-
formed of the latest developments and benefits to the population at
large. 169 Of all of these influences, HMOs are having the most significant
impact on the practice of psychotherapy.
B. HMOs & Psychotherapy
From an economic standpoint, the advent of managed care-and its
accompanying financial realities-has been a primary impetus for the
evolution of psychology.170 Managed care, with its goal of limiting expen-
ing psychotherapy in the United States. See id. at 69 (stating that psychoanalysis
spread from Europe to cities in United States in 1930s and 1940s). World War II
stressed the importance of understanding psychological factors of behavior and
functioning, and lead to the rise of Veterans Administration Programs. See id. at
77. The establishment of Veterans' Administration Programs provided the profes-
sion with its first clear training guidelines and defined the psychologists role to
encompass individual and group psychotherapy. See id. at 77-78. The advent of
community mental health centers provided the first model for delivering outpa-
tient care and allowed psychotherapists to migrate to rural areas. See id. at 87.
169. See id. at 95-96 (discussing policy involvement and advocacy). Until the
early 1970s, mental health professionals were not active in advocacy or policy for-
mulation. See id. at 95. In the 1970s, economic growth slowed, and psychologists
became active in attempting to influence Congress' allocation of funding for
mental health services. See id.
170. See Mary Jane England, From Fee-For Service to Accountable Health Plans, in
ALLIES AND ADVERSARIES: THE IMPACT OF MANAGED CARE ON MENTAL HEALTH SER-
vIcES 3-8 (Robert K. Schreter et al. eds., 1994) [hereinafter ALLIES AND ADVERSA-
RIES] (describing mental health reform in context of managed care environment);
Goldner, supra note 149, at 1438 (noting that managed care dominates health care
system and that over 140 million individuals rely on managed care for health ser-
vices). Managed care is defined by the Institute of Medicine as "a set of techniques
used by or on behalf of purchasers of health benefits to manage health care costs
by influencing patient care decisionmaking through case-by-case assessment of the
appropriateness of care prior to its provision." John Petrila, Ethics, Money, and the
Problem of Coercion in Managed Behavioral Healthcare, 40 ST. Louis U. L.J. 359, 363-64
(1996) (citing -COMMITrEE ON UTILIZATION MANAGEMENT BY THIRD PARTIES, INSTI-
TUTE OF MEDICINE, CONTROLLING COSTS AND CHANGING PATIENT CARE? THE ROLE
OF UTILIZATION MANAGEMENT 2-3 (M.J. Field & B.H. Gray eds., 1989)). Currently,
there are 175 million Americans enrolled in a managed behavioral healthcare
plan, a number that has increased over twenty percent since 1996. See Miller, supra
note 5, at R1 (noting increase in managed care enrollment since 1996). Prior to
the advent of managed care, a fee-for-service scheme dominated mental health
treatment. See Goldner, supra note 149, at 1445 (describing scheme in which pa-
tients chose their doctor and doctors had absolute control of treatment; scheme
lasted until mid-1980s). Fee-for-service benefits allow patients to select their own
provider and method of treatment, and the mental health professional worked
autonomously making treatment decisions based on the best interests of their pa-
tient with little consideration for the cost of proposed treatment. See Petrila, supra,
at 378 (noting that fee-for-service programs presented doctors with few dilemmas
between cost and care). The nature of the fee-for-service system led to what has
been considered an over-utilization of mental health services and ultimately the
demise of fee-for-service in the mental healthcare industry. See Goldner, supra note
149, at 1446 (stating that because doctors were paid more for doing more and
because fee-for-service plans provided for all-or-nothing mental care, many pa-
tients stayed in mental hospitals even though they did not need that treatment).
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diture, has had an enormous impact upon mental health treatment given
that financial concerns were the primary motivation for moving to a man-
aged care model for mental health services in the first place.1 71 The initial
impetus for this shift occurred in the 1980s, when there was a significant
growth in for-profit psychiatric hospitals.' 72 This shift was further fueled
by the perception that the cost of delivering mental health services was
.increasing at an alarming rate.' 73 In addition, managed care is becoming
even more prominent and crucial in the delivery of mental health services
in publicly financed mental health systems, such as state psychiatric hospi-
tals.' 74 The expansion of Medicaid funding for mental health treatment
has been another catalyst for the entrenchment of managed care in the
mental health system. 175 As expenditures in Medicare and other social
programs increased, fiscal and political issues forced government entities
to move to a managed care model for mental health treatment. 176
1. Utilization Review & Psychotherapy
Although managed care's initial and primary focus was the delivery of
health services for physical ailments, it was not long after their inception
that some HMOs began providing mental health coverage. 177 Given man-
171. See Laurie M. Flynn, Managed Care and Mental Illness, in ALLIES AND AD-
VERSARIES, supra note 170, at 203-10 (noting that managed care considers mentally
ill to be bad actuarial risks); see also Petrila, supra note 170, at 374-76 (discussing
possible negative effects of managed care in mental health arena). The major ar-
eas of concern are that managed behavioral health care will have a negative effect
on individual psychotherapy and that the seriously mentally ill will be denied long
term care. See id.
172. See Henry T. Harbin, Inpatient Services, in ALLIES AND ADVERSARIES, supra
note 170, at 11-22 (discussing conflicts between managed care companies and psy-
chiatric hospitals); Petrila, supra note 170, at 369-70 (discussing managed behav-
ioral health and patient autonomy). This increase in psychiatric bed capacity was
particularly evident in psychiatric facilities that provided assistance for children
and adolescents. See id. at 369. To fill this capacity, facilities actively marketed for
patients and the probable result was inappropriate psychiatric commitments and
treatment. See id. The shift to managed care was prompted by this phenomenon
as a method of containing costs. See id.
.173. See Petrila, supra note 170, at 370 (noting that mental health care costs
rose at rate higher than overall inflation rate for health care expenditures).
174. See id. at 370-73 (discussing overall decline in state hospital capacity and
impact of Medicaid programs).
175. See id. at 371-73 (discussing Medicare's impact on expanding financial
base for mental health treatment).
176. See id. (noting states' requests that federal government allow them to
switch from fee-for-service public plans to managed care); see also Goldner, supra
note 149, at 1445-51 (discussing replacement of fee-for-service mental health pro-
grams with managed mental health care).
177. See Goldner, supra note 149, at 1439 (noting inception of mental health
coverage and behavioral health care by HMOs); see also Michael S. Pallak, Managed
Care and Outcome-Based Standards in the Health Care Revolution, in SCIENTIFIC STAN-
DARDS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL PRACTICE, supra note 2, at 73 (discussing shift from fee-
for-service health care to managed care). With mental health care costs continu-
ing to rise annually, managed behavioral healthcare organizations, or "carve outs"
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aged care's ability and need to contain costs and today's political and eco-
nomic realities, it is not surprising that HMOs have made further inroads
into the realm of mental health care over the last three decades and now
appear to be here to stay. 178 In addition to having a financial impact on
have become prevalent. See Goldner, supra note 149, at 1448 (discussing inception
of Managed Behavioral Health Organizations as significant development in provi-
sion of psychiatric and other mental health care services); see also Kyle L. Grazier,
Managing Behavioral Health, 43 J. HEALTHCARE MGMT. 393, 395 (1998) (pointing
out that over sixty percent of Americans are enrolled in managed behavioral
health plan and most states have carved out their mental health benefits from
regular benefits under their Medicaid programs). Managed behavioral healthcare
organizations ("MBHO") administer mental health benefits separately from gen-
eral health care benefits and typically cover only the cost of outpatient visits and
inpatient facilities, while the original managed care company continues to cover
the cost of prescription drugs. See Rebecca A. Clay, Psychotherapy Is Cost Effective, 31
MONITOR ON PSYCHOL. (2000), available at http://www.apa.org/monitor/jan00/
pr2.html (describing dealings with managed care companies). Specializing in be-
havioral healthcare, the MBHO evaluates and pools the risk associated with all
recipients of mental health benefits and establishes a payment rate indicative of
the anticipated costs of services. See Goldner, supra note 149, at 1449-50. In ex-
change for assuming all of the financial risk and responsibility associated with the
provision of mental health benefits, the MBHO becomes the ultimate decision-
maker asserting full control over the administration of behavioral healthcare ser-
vices. See id. at 1450. Cost containment is achieved by utilizing three different
approaches: "(1) reduced reliance on inpatient care, especially for substance
abuse; (2) reduced prices paid to providers; and (3) shorter outpatient episodes of
care." Richard G. Frank et al., The Politics and Economics of Mental Health Paity
Laws, HEALTH AFF., July-Aug. 1997. The impact has been significant. A 1999 Hay
Group study of 1043 employers found that behavioral healthcare spending in the
private sector accounted for 3.2% of all healthcare costs in 1998, down from 6.1%
in 1988. See Findlay, supra note 3, at 121 (citing study). Nationally, behavioral
healthcare spending fell to 8% of all healthcare expenditures, down from 9% in
1986. See id. (citing T. MARK ET AL., NATIONAL EXPENDITURES FOR MENTAL HEALTH,
ALCOHOL, AND OTHER DRUG ABUSE TREATMENT (1996)). There are those who
champion the advent of the MBHO, but industry critics and many behavioral
healthcare professionals maintain that cost savings have been realized at the ex-
pense of the quality and quantity of care received, therapeutic ethics, and most
importantly, the patient's recovery. See Goldner, supra note 149, at 1468 (arguing
that MBHO practices leave patients untreated and under-treated, resulting in over-
all compromise of patient health and medical ethics).
178. See Findlay, supra note 3, at 116 (discussing managed care's rapid move-
ment into mental health care). Goldner notes that:
The development of managed care has brought with it needed rationali-
zation into a health care system and its finances that was rapidly spinning
out of control. The annual growth in national health expenditures in
1980 was 12.9% and in 1990 it was 11.0%. By 1993 it had decreased to
8.6%. Between 1993 and 1996, the figures had further declined to 5.6%,
4.8% and 4.4% respectively, an average of 5%, compared to an average
annual growth increase of 11.7% between 1966 and 1993. The 1996 fig-
ure was the slowest growth rate since 1960. Total general costs for provid-
ing outpatient care are cut approximately in half in instances when a
patient sees a primary care physician ("PCP") first due to lower fees for
their services, PCPs providing a less resource-intensive style of practice
than specialists, and lower reimbursement for established, as opposed to
new, patients.
Goldner, supra note 149, at 1442-43.
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the delivery of mental health services, managed care has also had a signifi-
cant impact on the providers of mental health services. 179 In the eyes of
many in the mental health professions, the impact has been a negative
one. 180
Many of the criticisms aimed at HMOs and their delivery of mental
health services parallel the criticisms of general health care practition-
ers. 18 1 Some of these criticisms include decreased quality of care,
breaches of confidentiality, provision of fewer services, destruction of the
professional therapeutic relationship and inappropriate decision-making
by utilization review administrators. 18 2 Of these criticisms, the utilization
179. See Goldner, supra note 149, at 1439-40 (noting impact of managed care
on provider autonomy and decision-making).
180. See id. (noting that insurers decide which providers will be authorized to
render services).
181. See id. at 1440 (stating that many problems caused by managed care in
health care affect mental health care even "more poignantly"); see also Petrila,
supra note 170, at 364 (noting that all forms of managed care attempt to contain
health care costs and alter traditional doctor patient relationship).
182. See Ellen Wertheimer, Ockham's Scalpel: A Return to a Reasonableness Stan-
dard, 43 VILL. L. REv. 321, 325-30 (1998) (discussing rationing by HMOs); Council
on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American Medical Association, Ethical Issues in Man-
aged Care, 273J. AM. MED. Ass'N 330, 331 (1995) (discussing compromised quality
of patient care); Jack Olender, Doctors Agree Managed Care Cost-Cutting Is Hazardous,
WASH. INFORMER, Sept. 18, 1996, at 12 (discussing negative impact of cost cutting
in managed care). But see Barry R. Furrow, Incentivizing Medical Practice: What (If
Anything) Happens to Professionalism?, 1 WIDENER L. SvMP. J. 1, 3 (1996) (discussing
HMOs' assertions that quality of care is unaffected by managed care).
Designed to eliminate unnecessary care, utilization review is an integral part
of managed care's cost containment program. It is also the foremost reason be-
hind the therapist's loss of control in the therapeutic decision making process. See
Goldner, supra note 149, at 1455 (discussing negative reaction of therapists to utili-
zation review). Utilization review involves the healthcare providers' attempt to
convince a reviewer that a patient is in need of mental healthcare. See id. There
are three types of utilization review: prospective, concurrent, and retrospective.
Prospective utilization review, similar to "gate keeping," takes place before treat-
ment is administered and determines whether treatment is even necessary. See
Tom J. Manos, Take Half an Aspirin and Call Your HMO in the Morning-Medical Mal-
practice in Managed Care: Are HMOs Practicing Medicine Without a License?, 53 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 195, 216 (1999) (defining prospective utilization review as decision
whether proposed treatment is medically necessary). Concurrent utilization re-
view occurs while the patient is in the midst of treatment and assesses whether
continued treatment is warranted. See id. Finally, retrospective utilization review
occurs upon the completion of treatment and dictates whether the cost of services
rendered will be reimbursed. See id. at 217. If the treatment is deemed unneces-
sary, reimbursement is denied. See id. Typically, utilization review is performed by
an independent organization and, unlike the gatekeeper, the reviewer is a mental
health professional. See Goldner, supra note 149, at 1458.
As a result of managed care, patients must contend with restricted access to
treatment, limited provider options, caps on the number of hospital days or outpa-
tient visits and annual or lifetime dollar limits on mental health benefits that are
almost non-existent in general medicine. See Philip Boyle, Managed Care in Mental
Health: A Cure, or a Cure Worse Than the Disease?, 40 ST. Louis U. LJ. 437, 439
(1996) (noting deficiencies in access to treatment and continued inferior services
for mental health as compared to those for physical health); see also Heather
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Fields, Managed Mental Health Care: Changing the Future of Mental Health Treatment,
28J. HEALTH L. 344, 346 (1995) (noting that coverage for physical illness is based
on medical necessity as opposed to mental illness, which is covered based on dura-
tion of illness, resulting in lack of coverage for chronic mental illnesses that do not
respond to brief forms of psychotherapy). In addition, patients are frequently de-
nied treatment or, in the alternative, are subjected to the least expensive remedy,
which is tantamount to remaining untreated. See Goldner, supra note 149, at 1452
(discussing financial incentives used by managed care to influence doctors not to
refer patients to specialists, to order fewer diagnostic tests and to prescribe less
expensive treatments); Manos, supra, at 203 (reporting effects of HMOs on behav-
ioral health care). Perhaps most daunting to the individual seeking mental health
treatment is the "gatekeeper." A managed care phenomenon, it is the gatekeeper
who makes the initial assessment as to whether treatment is necessary. See Fields,
supra, at 349 (describing typical managed care "gatekeeper" system). Until re-
cently, most of these decision-makers were non-psychiatric or even worse, non-
medical employees severely deficient in their knowledge of the workings of the
human mind. See Goldner, supra note 149, at 1472-73 (citing various commenta-
tors concerned about training of gatekeepers). Under a traditional HMO plan, a
patient selects a PCP who provides for the patient's routine medical needs and
assumes the role of gatekeeper, assessing whether the individual needs specialized
treatment including mental health services. See Fields, supra, at 349. The primary
care physician as gatekeeper presents several problems including, but not limited
to, the lack of time spent with each patient, and the PCP's lack of psychiatric train-
ing. See id.
Because increased patient volume is the key element of the cost cutting equa-
tion, primary care physicians are forced to spend a limited amount of time with
each patient; the average consultation is six to seven minutes. See Goldner, supra
note 149, at 1452. This is unfortunate as one of the most critical phases of psycho-
therapy is the evaluation phase when a patient relates to a therapist his or her
reasons for seeking help. See ROBERTJ. URSANO ET AL., CONCISE GUIDE TO PSYCHO-
DYNAMIC PSYCHOTHERAPY- PRINCIPLES AND TECHNIQUES IN THE ERA OF MANAGED
CARE 24-27 (2d ed. 1998). Another difficulty with the PCP as gatekeeper is the
PCP's lack of mental health training. See Boyle, supra, at 446 (noting frequent
criticism of non-psychiatric gatekeepers to mental health). Studies show that fifty-
seven percent of those seeking mental health treatment turn first to their primary
care physician. See Fields, supra, at 345 (citing Federic G. Reamer, The Contemporary
Mental Health System: Facilities, Services, Personnel, and Finances, in HANDBOOK ON
MENTAL HEALTH POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 21, 23 (David A. Rochefort ed.,
1989)). That seems illogical when one considers that the majority of medical
schools in this country provide only one month of psychiatric training as part of
the clinical education program. See Goldner, supra note 149, at 1454 n.100 (citing
Leon Eisenberg, Treating Depression and Anxiety in the Primary Care Setting, HEALTH
A-r., Fall 1997, at 149-51). In fact, it spells a recipe for disaster as evidenced by
research showing that the PCP's rate of failure in detecting psychiatric disorders
ranges from forty-five to ninety percent. See id. Criticized for inadequate mental
health training, gatekeepers are credited as one of the leading causes behind the
diminished quality of care in the managed care setting.
The gatekeeper is a formidable barrier to treatment, and even if a patient
makes it across the threshold, the managed care industry has set up many addi-
tional roadblocks to keep treatment costs contained. A limited choice of providers
has forced many patients to sever long-term therapeutic relationships with their
therapists because he or she is not a preferred provider and therefore the sessions
are not covered. See Miller, supra note 5, at RI. In fact, forty-two percent of mental
health patients covered by managed care altered their treatment plans for finan-
cial reasons as opposed to twenty-nine percent of mental health patients covered
by a traditional insurance plan. See generally Mental Health: A Little Goes a Long Way,
supra note 3. Although insurance industry experts have applauded carve-outs for
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review process appears to receive the most criticism from the mental
health profession. 183 The main criticism is that the patient's quality of
care suffers, especially in outpatient settings.1 84 Managed care has made
utilization review and cost-cutting in the outpatient area a priority, despite
increasing the number of people receiving outpatient mental health services, such
increases have resulted in a reduced number of authorized visits per user. See
Grazier, supra note 177, at 395.
Managed care presents its fair share of difficulties for the clinician as well as
the patient. Tools such as utilization review, economic credentialing and symptom
checklists are just a few of the mechanisms by which the managed care industry has
taken the wheel from the clinician and placed themselves in the driver's seat.
Once managed care administrators have decided that specialized treatment is
needed, a provider is chosen from a select list of clinicians known as "preferred
providers." The preferred provider, in exchange for a steady flow of clients, agrees
to accept limited treatment goals and a restricted number of sessions at a predeter-
mined amount, which is often less than what the clinician could receive outside of
the managed care plan. See Goldner, supra note 149, at 1453. In addition, most
preferred providers have undergone a qualifying process known as economic
credentialing. This grade-making process allows managed care administrators to
select only those providers with a demonstrated ability to minimize referrals to
expensive specialists and curtail the use of supplementary services. See id. at 1448.
Limited treatment duration and restrictions on covered diagnoses have impeded
the clinician's ability to evaluate and treat patients in the manner they deem neces-
sary. For instance, the evaluation phase typically requires several hours in order to
establish an accurate diagnosis. See KENNETH S. POPE & MELBAJ.T. VASQUEZ, ETH-
ICS IN PSYCHOTHERAPY AND COUNSELING: A PRACTICAL. GUIDE 151 (2d ed. 1998)
(noting that full evaluation often requires several hours of testing and report prep-
aration). Most managed care plans, however, will only reimburse the clinician for
the first hour of client assessment. See id. This leaves the therapist no choice but
to rush the assessment or provide the additional sessions free of charge. To ensure
that treatment is not rendered needlessly, managed care companies have intro-
duced symptom checklists into the therapeutic relationship. Used by both clini-
cians and gatekeepers, symptom checklists serve as a script for each diagnosis,
dictating both the diagnosis to be found and the type of treatment to be employed
regardless of the specific needs of a particular client. See Miller, supra note 5, at
RI. Such checklists are frequently criticized as being too vague, making an accu-
rate patient assessment difficult. See Goldner, supra note 149, at 1452. Checklists
also make it abundantly clear which diagnosis will be covered and which will not.
This has spawned the temptation to misdiagnose a patient with a covered disorder
rather than report the actual diagnosis, which is not covered. See POPE & VASQUEZ,
supra, at 151.
183. See Goldner, supra note 149, at 1455-59 (discussing various forms of utili-
zation review in managed mental health care). Utilization review is "the system
put in place by payers and their surrogates to 'monitor the level, length and inten-
sity of covered treatment,' thus containing costs by limiting demand." Id. at 1456
(quoting BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW 795 (3d ed. 1997)). Generally,
utilization review is used to control costs by assuring treatment is a medical neces-
sity given an existing standard of practice. See id.
184. See id. at 1455 (noting that between 1985 and 1991 percentage of individ-
uals subject to some form of utilization review increased by approximately forty
percent). Many criticisms suggest that utilization review inappropriately limits ses-
sions, making it difficult to properly diagnose and treat even the most common
and easily identifiable forms of mental illness. See id. at 1454-55 (asserting that
reimbursement strategies of managed behavioral health care undervalue "cogni-
tive services" and overemphasize medication in attempt to limit length of doctors'
visits).
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the fact that the outpatient population accounts for only approximately
twenty percent of mental health care expenditures.1 8 5
From the managed care standpoint, utilization review in the mental
health setting involves four elements: (1) an independent and scientific
determination that the proposed treatment is effective; (2) an indepen-
dent and scientific determination that the treatment is the appropriate
response to the presenting problem; (3) the ability to evaluate the pres-
ence of symptoms and the need for treatment through a short question-
naire or phone interview; and (4) the ability to refuse authorization for
treatment when there is inadequate justification for it.186 In short, treat-
ment plans for mental illness under managed care should "include clear,
measurable, and realistic goals to address the presenting problem, with
the focus on alleviating the patient's impairments and increasing [the pa-
tient's] level of functioning." 18 7 Although this approach has led to signifi-
cant cost savings for managed health care, it has been criticized by the
mental health profession as being a limited approach that focuses only on
short-term resolution of acute episodes of distress.' 8 8
The delivery of mental health services under managed care is further
complicated by certain difficulties not encountered by the typical general
health care practitioner. 189 Many of these difficulties are a direct result of
attempts by the mental health profession to diagnose and treat a wide vari-
ety of mental illnesses with a wide variety of treatment options, many of
which are of questionable effectiveness.19 0 Although treatments for most
medical conditions are well established, the treatment of many mental ill-
nesses is subject to a wide variety of interventions-interventions that are
frequently tied to the mental health practitioner's theoretical orienta-
tion.19 ' For example, a cognitive-behavioral therapist might choose a
185. See id. at 1462-63 (discussing managed care's "aggressive" efforts to cut
costs in outpatient mental health care); see also Daniel Y. Patterson, Outpatient Ser-
vices, in ALLIES AND ADVERSARIES, supra note 170, at 51-60 (discussing managed care
strategies toward outpatient mental health care and clinical implications).
186. See Goldner, supra note 149, at 1463 (noting that utilization review in
mental health arena focuses on assessment of patient's presenting problems and
not on reasons for development of disorder). Generally, managed care organiza-
tions require the presence of a diagnosable mental disorder as specified by the
criteria established by the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statis-
tical Manual (4th ed.) ("DSM-IV"). See id. at 1464 (noting that managed care is not
interested in providing treatment for self-improvement, but only for present
disorders).
187. Id.
188. See id. at 1465 (noting that short-term intervention may be inadequate
for between twenty and thirty percent of patients and does not resolve underlying
causal factors, making relapse likely).
189. See id. at 1440-41 (noting aspects of mental health care that make it diffi-
cult to practice: difficult diagnosis, uncertain treatments and people without
problems seeking help).
190. See id. at 1441 (discussing lack of effectiveness of many treatments).
191. See id. at 1441-42 (discussing connection between interventions and prac-
titioner's theoretical orientation).
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brief, structured problem-solving approach to the treatment of depres-
sion, while a psychodynamically oriented practitioner might opt for a less
structured and more long-term approach focusing on object relations,
transference, and their relationship to depression. Some would argue that
both types of therapy-indeed that all types of therapy-are beneficial.' 9 2
Although certain factions of the mental health industry have supported
this statement, managed care clearly does not agree, and refuses to pay for
what it deems to be ineffective treatments.1 93
Despite this disagreement, the mental health industry is being forced
to accommodate to the cost cutting and "effective" treatment mandates of
managed care. 19 4 Although the disciplines of psychology and psychiatry
can now claim approximately four hundred different treatment modalities
and schools of thought, a variety of economic, political, legal, ethical and
social forces are driving the profession towards identifying which of these
treatments is effective and, therefore, towards the use of empirically vali-
dated treatments.1 9 5
2. The American Psychological Association's Response and Randomized
Clinical Trials
Initially, political, economic and social pressure forced the discipline
of psychology to consider the current state of knowledge and treatment
modalities in the delivery/field of psychotherapy.' 96 Political pressure was
the direct result of the United States' consideration of a nationwide health
192. See SELIGMAN, supra note 4, at 9-10 (discussing impact of client character-
istics on treatment effectiveness). Seligman discusses the critical role of client
characteristics and treatment outcome. These characteristics are often difficult to
operationalize, and frequently confound the results of empirical effectiveness stud-
ies. These factors include: genetic, developmental, or other predisposing factors;
demographics (age, marital status, family constellation); source of referral and ap-
parent motivation for treatment; treatment history (what has and has not worked
in the past); personality profile (interpersonal and intrapsychic dynamics of a cli-
ent including cognitions, affect, behavior, defenses and lifestyle); relevant develop-
mental history; and client mental status (assessment of client's orientation to
reality, level of functioning, and impairment). See id.
193. See Nicholas A. Cummings, The Role of the Psychologist, in ALLIES AND AD-
VERSARIES, supra note 170, at 117-23 (discussing importance of treatment outcome
research in managed care setting).
194. See Anthony F. Panzetta, The Role of the Psychiatrist: The Managed Care
View, in ALLIES AND ADVERSARIES, supra note 170, at 103-16 (noting that standards
for therapy outcomes will be standardized under managed care).
195. See Larry E. Beutler, Identifying Empirically Supported Treatments: What If We
Didn't?, 66J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 113, 113-20 (1998) (noting that
American Psychological Association established Division 12 Task Force on Promo-
tion and Dissemination of Psychological Procedures to determine which of over
400 psychotherapies were effective). For a discussion of the impact of empirically
validated treatments on the practice of psychotherapy, see SCIENTIFIC STANDARDS
OF PSYCHOLOGICAL PRACTICE, supra note 2.
196. For a brief history of and the major issues in psychotherapy outcome
research, see Hans H. Strupp & Kenneth I. Howard, A Brief History of Psychotherapy
Research, in HISTORY OF PSYCHOTHERAPY: A CENTURY OF CHANGE, supra note 81, at
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care policy. 197 At the time, psychotherapy was not covered in any of the
proposed plans. 198 Without the foundation of insurance reimbursement,
the discipline was faced with the very real possibility of financial extinc-
tion. In response to these pressures, the American Psychological Associa-
tion ("APA") established the Division 12 Task Force on Promotion and
Dissemination of Psychological Procedures ("APA Task Force").199 The
mandate of the APA Task Force was to determine which of the myriad
psychotherapies being offered to the general public were effective.
200
Without these data, managed health care and the legal system would be-
gin to force a distinction between different types of psychotherapy without
input or guidance from the discipline. 20 1 After reviewing the relevant
literature and noting that the list was far from complete, the APA Task
309-34; Sol L. Garfield, Major Issues in Psychotherapy Research, in HISTORY OF PSYCHO-
THERAPY: A CENTURY OF CHANGE, supra note 81, at 335-59.
197. See Beutler, supra note 195, at 113 (discussing political and social forces
at work when APA Task Force was commissioned).
198. See id. at 114 (noting that psychotherapy was in danger of being excluded
from plans).
199. See id. at 113 (detailing origins of APA Division 12 Task Force).
200. See id. (stating that APA Task Force's purpose was to determine which
treatments were efficacious). To determine which treatments were effective, the
APA Task Force used criteria adapted from guidelines established by the Food and
Drug Administration ("FDA") and focused on countless research studies. See id.
201. See id. at 114 (noting that field of psychology was "faced with the possibil-
ity that the courts and legislative bodies would define, non-empirically, what types
of psychotherapy could and could not be practiced and reimbursed in a system of
managed competition"). In the late 1970s, the courts and the legislatures had al-
ready established non-empirically based distinctions between psychotherapies in
the context of malpractice litigation. See id. These standards were typified by the
principle of the community standard and the doctrine of the respectable minority.
See id. One commentator noted:
The first of these principles reduced the task of selecting effective
treatments to matters of popularity and common use. Treatments that
are frequently practiced within a given community are held.., to be valid
and true, regardless of their clinical effectiveness or their potential for
harm. Reliance on this principle obviates the need for scientific research
at all, subserving it to the whims of popular appeal to professionals within
a given region.
Yet, the court[s] also attempted to address the fact that profound
splits in the mental health field frequently prevented the emergence of a
clear community standard. They developed the doctrine of respectable
minority to address the fact that none of the professionally initiated ef-
forts to establish diagnostic and treatment standards have enjoyed wide-
spread acceptance within the mental health professions. This doctrine
assumes the necessary task of defining effective treatments when the pro-
fessions fail to develop such guidelines.
This respectable minority doctrine holds that where there are dis-
putes based on theoretical differences and methods of practice, the clini-
cian is entitled to be judged according to the school he or she professes
to follow. This school must be one of definite principles, and it must be
the line of thought of a respectable minority of the profession.
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Force identified a small number of effective empirically validated
psychotherapies.
20 2
Generally, empirically validated treatments are defined as therapies
that have been found to be successful in treating psychological disorders
in controlled research studies with delineated populations. 20 3 The use of
202. See id. at 113 (noting that many critics of APA Task Force think that un-
derlying assumptions of selection process were unnecessarily narrow). The APA
Task Force also noted that the list did not substitute for a practitioner's own deci-
sions about what constituted the proper treatment approach for any given client.
See Dianne L. Chambless et al., An Update on Empirically Validated Therapies, The
Clinical Psychologist, 6, available at http://www.apa.org/divisions/divl 2/est/
newrpt.html (qualifying APA Task Force list). The latest information available
from the APA lists what it considers to be empirically validated treatments: cogni-
tive-behavioral therapy for panic disorder with and without agoraphobia, cognitive
behavioral therapy for generalized anxiety disorder, group cognitive behavioral
therapy for social phobia, exposure treatment for social phobia, exposure and re-
sponse prevention for obsessive-compulsive disorder, stress inoculation training for
coping with stressors, systematic desensitization for simple phobia, cognitive ther-
apy for depression, interpersonal therapy for depression, behavioral therapy for
headache, cognitive behavioral therapy for irritable bowel syndrome, cognitive be-
havioral therapy for chronic pain, cognitive behavioral therapy for bulimia, inter-
personal therapy for bulimia, behavior modification for enuresis, parent training
programs for children with oppositional behavior, behavioral marital therapy, be-
havior therapy for female orgasmic dysfunction and male erectile dysfunction,
family education programs for schizophrenia, behavior modification for develop-
mentally disabled individuals, token economy programs. See Beutler, supra note
195, at 126-27. The APA also lists treatments that are "probably efficacious," mean-
ing preliminary research has been conducted but replication of the results is still
pending: applied relaxation for panic disorder, applied relaxation for generalized
anxiety disorder, exposure treatment for PTSD, group exposure and response pre-
vention for obsessive-compulsive disorder, relapse prevention program for obses-
sive-compulsive disorder, behavior therapy for cocaine abuse, brief dynamic
therapy for opiate dependence, cognitive therapy for opiate dependence, cogni-
tive behavioral therapy for benzodiazepine withdrawal in panic disorder patients,
brief dynamic therapy for depression, cognitive therapy for depression for geriatric
patients, psychoeducational treatment of depression, reminiscence therapy for de-
pression for geriatric patients, self-control therapy for depression, behavior ther-
apy for childhood obesity, group cognitive behavioral therapy for bulimia,
emotionally focused couples therapy, insight oriented marital therapy, behavior
modification of encopresis, family anxiety management training for anxiety disor-
ders, behavior modification for sex offenders, dialectical behavior therapy for bor-
derline personality disorder, habit reversal and control techniques. See id. (listing
treatments that are "probably efficacious").
203. See Dianne L. Chambless & Steven D. Hollon, Defining Empirically Sup-
ported Therapies, 66 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 7, 7 (1998) (proposing
method for determining when psychological treatment for specific disorder is es-
tablished in efficacy or is efficacious); Philip Kendall, Empirically Supported Psycholog-
ical Therapies, 66 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 3, 3 (1998) (defining
empirically validated treatment as psychological treatments that have been ex-
posed to evaluation using accepted methods of psychological science and treat-
ment outcome). Empirically supported treatments are validated by relying on
external criteria and statistical estimates of probability in an attempt to eliminate
or minimize potential human biases on the evaluation procedure. See Larry E.
Beutler & Eve H. Davison, What Standards Should We Use?, in SCIENTIFIC STANDARDS
OF PRACTICE, supra note 2, at 18 (discussing empirical approaches to validation).
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controlled research allows the investigator to conclude that any observable
beneficial effects are attributable to the therapy itself and not to some
uncontrolled-for confounding variable. 20 4 In other words, the use of con-
trolled research is an attempt to demonstrate a cause and effect relation-
ship between therapy and improvement.20 5
Currently, the gold medal standard for controlled efficacy research in
the field of psychology is the randomized clinical trial ("RCT"), in which
patients are randomly assigned to the treatment of interest or to one or
more comparison groups. 20 6 The general purpose of the RCT model is to
provide the necessary scientific objectivity and control for demonstrating a
cause and effect relationship between the treatment intervention and
treatment outcome.20 7 The RCT design accomplishes this by controlling
for and eliminating as many extraneous variables as possible, leaving the
204. See Chambless & Hollon, supra note 203, at 7 (noting that some of these
confounding variables can include large number of factors such as passage of time,
effects of psychological assessment and patient/therapist traits). Some commenta-
tors also note that the nature of empirical approaches is not set in stone, and the
use of different empirical criteria can produce remarkably different results regard-
ing which treatments are the most clinically effective. See Beutler & Davison, supra
note 203, at 15-21 (discussing empirical and non-empirical approaches to valida-
tion). Different approaches to empirical validity include theoretical validity, repli-
cability and incremental validity. See id. at 18-21. Theoretical validity stands for the
proposition that if a theory is valid, then the method it employs must also be, and
vice versa. See id. at 18 (noting that theoretical validity is common approach to
selection of therapeutic approaches). Replicability posits that when a phenome-
non can be objectively observed or measured on at least two separate occasions,
then it must be valid. See id. at 19 (noting that this position has been adopted by
APA Task Force on Promotion and Dissemination of Psychological Procedures).
Incremental validity asserts that "unless a procedure is better than a minimal inter-
vention or assessment condition, it cannot be justified." Id. In contrast are non-
empirical approaches to validity, approaches that have typified the practice of psy-
chology today and in the past. See id. at 15-16 (noting that non-empirical criteria
are common in graduate level training). Nonempirical approaches to validity in-
clude face validity and consensual validity. See id. Face validity stands for the pro-
position that the proof of validity is a logical fit between the explanation and one's
own personal experiences. See id. at 15 (describing face validity as "it looks good
and is logical" validity). Similarly, consensual validity stands for the proposition
that proof of validity is established when it receives public support or the support
of authorities in the field of specialty. See id. at 17 (describing consensual validity
as "everyone knows it true" validity).
205. See T.D. Borkovec & Louis G. Castonguay, What Is the Scientific Meaning of
Empirically Supported Therapy?, 66 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 136, 136
(1998) (discussing nature of experimental therapy outcome research). This cause
and effect relationship is demonstrated by eliminating competing causes. See id.
These competing causes are controlled for by holding as many variables as possible
constant across comparison groups except for the variable of interest-in this case,
the therapy in question. See id.
206. See id. (detailing experimental therapy outcome research); see also Jac-
queline B. Persons & George Silberschatz, Are Results of Randomized Controlled Trials
Useful to Psychotherapists?, 66J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 126, 126 (1998)
(discussing use of RCTs and quality of patient care).
207. See Chambless & Hollon, supra note 203, at 8 (discussing overall research
design in therapy outcome research). See generally ALAN E. KAZDIN, RESEARCH DE-
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treatment intervention as the most reasonable explanation for patient im-
provement. 20 8 Once a treatment has been through the RCT process and
shown to be successful in treating a particular disorder, independent re-
search must replicate the results before the treatment can be identified as
efficacious.209
The fact that the APA Task Force only identified a handful of empiri-
cally validated treatments led to a firestorm of criticism because it left the
impression that most therapies were ineffective. 2 10 To address this misun-
derstanding, the APA Task Force issued an update to their original re-
port.2 11 In this update, the APA Task Force cautioned members about the
use of the list of treatments by noting that the list was far from complete,
pending further research; and that the list should not be a substitute for a
mental health professional's decisions about the most appropriate form of
intervention for a given client.2 12 The APA Task Force also specifically
addressed another issue on the minds of many members-managed care
and reimbursement. 21 3 Specifically, the APA Task Force stated:
This list is intended to facilitate education by identifying treat-
ments with a scientific basis .... [It] is far from complete and
should not be employed as the basis for decisions concerning re-
imbursable treatments by third party payers .... That a treat-
SIGN IN CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY (2d ed. 1992) (discussing various uses of research
design in clinical psychology).
208. See Chambless & Hollon, supra note 203, at 8 (discussing basic issues re-
searchers should consider in outcome research). Some of the basic issues in out-
come research involve sample selection, outcome assessment, treatment
implementation and data analysis. See id. at 9-12. Each of these elements is critical
to, and can effect the results of, outcome research. The selection of a clearly de-
fined population for which the treatment was designed and implemented is critical
to the later application of the therapy. For example, if an RCT study finds that a
new treatment for depression is efficacious for children and adolescents ages eight
through sixteen, then the population in question is children and adolescents ages
eight through sixteen. The results of the study support the proposition that the
treatment is an effective one for treating depression in this age group. The results
do not support the use of the treatment with adults or any other population
outside of the delineated age range. In other words, a treatment must be effica-
cious for a specific population. See id. at 9. Outcome assessment is another critical
aspect of the RCT design, and specific tools have to be developed that are reliable
and valid in measuring treatment outcome. See id. at 9-11. Treatment implemen-
tation is accomplished through the use of treatment manuals that standardize each
step of the therapeutic process. See id. at 11-12. Finally, errors in data analyses can
cause a researcher to accept a treatment as efficacious, when in reality it is not. See
id. at 12.
209. See id. at 8 (noting that efficacy usually requires at least two independent
studies reaching same conclusion).
210. See generally Persons & Silberschatz, supra note 206 (discussing pros and
cons of empirically validated treatments).
211. See Chambless et al., supra note 202, 1-2 (updating original report).
212. See id. 6 (clarifying limitations of list).
213. See id. (addressing managed care and reimbursement).
[Vol. 46: p. 33
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ment is not on our list in no way means that it has been shown to
be ineffective.2 14
Despite this attempt at reconciliation, the genie had already been let
out of the bottle, and now the mental health profession was forced to
grapple with issues such as "what is the future of psychology" and "what, if
any, is the importance of empirically validated treatments in that future."
The original conclusions of the APA Task Force sparked considerable
debate in the discipline, a debate that continues to rage today. The de-
bate focuses on how exactly "empirically validated treatment" should be
defined and whether a shift toward empirically validated treatments is the
proper course of evolution for the discipline generally, and therapy specif-
ically. The two main camps take diametrically opposite positions.2 15 The
first point of view is in favor of empirically based treatments, and, accord-
ingly, asserts that they are critical to clinicians and the ethical practice of
psychotherapy. 216 More specifically, proponents of empirically supported
treatments assert that practitioners must use them for clinical, ethical and
legal reasons.2 17 From a clinical standpoint, the results of RCTs allow cli-
nicians to make informed choices regarding treatment efficacy and other
possible treatment alternatives. 21 8 From an ethical standpoint, propo-
nents cite numerous authorities supporting the proposition that empiri-
cally based treatments are essential to the ethical practice of
psychotherapy. Proponents also note that, in certain circumstances, fail-
ure to use empirically supported treatments can have legal
consequences. 2 19
On the other side of the controversy, adversaries assert that the results
of the RCTs that support the use of empirically supported treatments are
useless to clinicians and have a minimal impact on the practice of psycho-
therapy. 220 The major criticism from this camp is that the method em-
ployed by RCTs does not adequately address the day-to-day realities and
intricacies of practicing psychotherapy. 22 1 Specific criticisms of the RCT
214. Id. 4.
215. See generally Persons & Silberschatz, supra note 206 (setting forth various
positions in mental health discipline regarding empirically validated treatments).
216. See id. at 126 (noting that question of whether randomized clinical trials
are useful to practicing clinicians is controversial in field of psychotherapy).
217. See id. (discussing relevance of RCTs to practice of psychotherapy).
218. See id. (asserting that results of RCTs are essential to improving quality of
care).
219. See id. (noting legal consequences of ignoring RCTs in practice).
220. See id. at 128 (disputing significance of RCTs). See generally Gerald C.
Davison & Arnold A. Lazarus, The Dialectics of Science and Practice, in SCIENTIFIC
STANDARDS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL PRACTICE, supra note 2, at 95 (discussing theory,
clinical practice and need for innovation); Linda J. Hayes, Achieving Synthesis, in
SCIENTIFIC STANDARDS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL PRACTICE, supra note 2, at 121 (noting
that therapy setting and process is critical to treatment of patient).
221. See Persons & Silberschatz, supra note 206, at 128 (stating that RCTs do
not address issues and concerns of practicing therapists). One commentator notes
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approach focus on a lack of basic knowledge in the area of mechanisms
that produce therapeutic change, unstudied confounding variables such
as level of empathy and therapeutic alliance and a lack of internal and
external validity.22 2 One prominent past-president of the APA has gone so
far as to state that although RCTs are an integral part of scientific study,
the scientific strengths of the RCT approach make it "the wrong method
for empirically validating psychotherapy as it is actually done, because it
omits too many crucial elements of what is done in the field."
223
3. The Ethics of RCTs
Although the debate among mental health care providers continues
to rage, the APA and the managed care industry have made their position
clear-empirically validated treatments are a critical component of estab-
lishing appropriate standards of practice and for the ethical practice of
psychotherapy. 224 The APA Task Force has gone so far as to state, and
other commentators agree that:
that RCT does not help a therapist answer certain basic questions endemic to the
therapy process:
When a patient seeks therapy, the therapist must try to answer sev-
eral basic questions: What is bothering the patient? What does the pa-
tient hope to accomplish in treatment? What has impeded the patient
from achieving his or her goals? How can the therapist best help the
patient?
I believe that certain kinds of research studies are capable of provid-
ing useful data to answer these fundamental clinical questions. However,
RCT's do not provide any meaningful help in addressing these questions
and, consequently, they have had very little impact on clinicians and on
the practice of psychotherapy.
Id. (citations omitted).
222. See generally William C. Follette, Correcting Methodological Weaknesses in the
Knowledge Base Used to Derive Practice Standards, in SCIENTIFIC STANDARDS OF PSYCHO-
LOGICAL PRACTICE, supra note 2, at 229 (asserting that current body of research
does not provide necessary data to make informed treatment choices and propos-
ing alternative methods for determining treatment efficacy); Logan Wright, Attend-
ing to Findings, in SCIENTIFIC STANDARDS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL PRACTICE, supra note 2,
at 248 (noting that even best data available of treatment effectiveness is primitive
at best).
223. Persons & Silberschatz, supra note 206, at 129 (quoting past APA presi-
dent Martin Seligman). Seligman identified five specific characteristics that are
not factored into RCTs. First, psychotherapy is not of fixed duration; it continues
until there is improvement or the patient terminates treatment. See id. Second,
therapy is self-correcting, with therapists modifying current treatments or adopting
new lines of treatment depending on the needs of the client. See id. Third, actual
psychotherapy patients choose a therapist and are not randomly assigned to one.
See id. Fourth, unlike RCT trials, actual psychotherapy patients frequently present
with multiple, comorbid problems. See id. Finally, psychotherapies overall goal is
to improve overall functioning and not just to produce symptomatic improvement.
See id.
224. SeeJohn Bartlett, Practice Guidelines: The Managed Care View, in ALLIES AND
ADVERSARIES, supra note 170, at 153-62 (discussing managed care's use of practice
guidelines as cost containment mechanism); Chambless et al., supra note 202,
32-35 (discussing ethics, science and clinical interventions).
[Vol. 46: p. 33
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[C]linical psychologists bring information about empirically sup-
ported treatments to bear when addressing their patients' legal
and ethical rights to informed consent to treatment and in-
formed refusal of treatment. As part of the consent process, cli-
nicians should make sure that clients understand what the
treatment can be reasonably expected to accomplish and in what
period of time, what any negative effects of the treatment might
be, what other treatments might be considered, and whether
these would be expected to be more or less helpful and more or
less costly. Clinicians who remain uninformed about the re-
search literature are ill-equipped to discuss these issues with cli-
ents and thus to discharge their ethical obligation. 225
Clearly, the ethical practice of psychotherapy mandates both the use of
empirically based interventions and the wisdom of full disclosure about
them.
Although informed consent is required for psychological treatments
involving physical touching, courts have not directly addressed the issue of
whether informed consent must be obtained before other psychological
services are rendered. 226 Because the courts have not addressed this issue
directly, mental health professionals are encouraged to look to their pro-
fessional code of ethics for guidance. 2 27 The Ethical Guidelines and Code
of Conduct for the American Psychological Association ("APA Ethical
Guidelines") 228 clearly support the use of empirically based treatments as
the current standard of practice.2 29 The APA Ethical Guidelines apply to
psychologists' scientific and professional roles, and can be applied and en-
forced by the APA and other sources of authority that choose to adopt
them.230 The Preamble of the APA Ethical Guidelines states that
"[pisychologists work to develop a valid and reliable body of scientific
knowledge based on research."23 1 Similarly, the APA Ethical Guidelines
note that psychologists "maintain knowledge of relevant scientific and pro-
fessional information related to the services they render ... [and] make
225. Chambless et al., supra note 202, 35. See generally POPE & VASQUEZ,
supra note 182 (discussing ethical considerations in practice of psychotherapy).
226. See DONALD N. BERSOFF ET AL., LAw & MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS 73
(1999) (noting that law does not require informed consent for psychological ser-
vices that do not involve physical touching).
227. See id. at 73-74 (advising mental health professionals where to look for
guidance).
228. AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, ETHICAL PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOL-
OGISTS AND CODE OF CONDUCT, app. J at 331 (1992), available at http://www.apa.
org/ethics/code.html (effective date Dec. 1, 1992).
229. See id. at 332 (noting that ethical standards set forth enforceable rules for
conduct of psychologists).
230. See id. (noting actions APA may pursue such as reprimand, censure, ter-
mination of membership and referral to other administrative bodies).
231. Id. at 333 (noting that overall goal of profession is to broaden knowledge
of human behavior).
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appropriate use of scientific ...resources."23 2 Furthermore, and more
specifically, the General Standards of the APA Ethical Guidelines note that
awareness of current scientific knowledge is critical to psychological exper-
tise and professional judgment. 233
Although the violation of the ethical standards does not, in and of
itself, establish legal liability or consequences, compliance or non-compli-
ance may be admissible in certain legal proceedings or disciplinary causes
of action. 234 Although admissible in certain legal proceedings, violations
of ethical standards alone do not create a free-standing legal cause of ac-
tion; however, in the case of informed consent and empirically supported
treatments, perhaps they should.2 35 Empirically supported treatments ap-
pear to play a critical role in the process of informed consent as well. This
Article asserts that failure to provide clients with appropriate information
in the informed consent process regarding empirically based treatments
should create a free-standing legal cause of action for failure to provide
informed consent based on both the failure to provide information about
the empirically supported treatment and any increased treatment cost that
results from that failure.
23 6
V. MENTAL HEALTH MALPRACTICE, STANDARDS OF CARE, INFORMED
CONSENT AND TORT LIABILITY
Although there are alternative theories, negligence is the primary
doctrine for holding mental health professionals liable in tort. To estab-
lish the tort of negligence, a patient must prove: (1) the existence of a
therapist/patient relationship; (2) a breach of the applicable standard of
care (i.e., the therapist has failed to act as a reasonable therapist in the
circumstances); (3) causation of injury to the patient by the breach; and
(4) damages.2 37 Because of the number of schools of thought and the
paucity of empirical data, part two-the standard of care-poses the great-
232. Id. at 333-34.
233. See id. at 335 (establishing code of conduct relevant to maintaining ex-
pertise and basis for scientific and professional judgments); see also Robyn M.
Dawes, Standards of Practice, in SCIENTIFIC STANDARDS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL PRACTICE,
supra note 2, at 31, 31-35 (asserting that standards of practice must guide how
professionals practice and not how they are trained).
234. See generally AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 228 (dis-
cussing other administrative remedies).
235. See Dawes, supra note 233, at 35 (stating that "practitioners should first
understand science and secondly be bound by it").
236. For further discussion, see supra note 25 and accompanying text.
237. See WILLIAM PROSSER & PAGE KEETON, ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 30 (5th
ed. 1984) (laying out elements for negligence). To establish a claim in negligence,
the plaintiff must prove four elements:
[A]II duty, or obligation, recognized by the law, requiring the person to
conform to a certain standard of conduct, for the protection of others
against unreasonable risks; [a breach of this duty]; [a] reasonably close
causal connection between the conduct and the resulting injury; [and]
[a]ctual loss or damage to the interests of another.
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est difficulty when applied to psychotherapy. Yet it is precisely this aspect
of the profession on which HMOs, with their goal of quick cures and uni-
form approaches, have their greatest impact.
Few cases directly address the negligence of mental health profession-
als in making diagnostic and treatment decisions. This is likely to change.
HMOs, and the need for reimbursement, are pushing psychotherapy into
a greater dependence upon RCTs and empirically validated treatments. If
a therapist recommends a treatment not supported by an RCT, and hence
not reimbursable, the patient may be able to sue on that basis. Of greater
importance, however, is the fact that RCTs may themselves create a stan-
dard of care by demonstrating what works in a given context. A therapist
who recommends a different treatment may find him or herself in viola-
tion of what has become, through HMO intervention, an identifiable stan-
dard of care, where previously there was none.
The law in this area, as it applies to mental health professionals, must
for the time being be analogized from its application to the field of
medicine. 238 Put simply, a mental health professional, like all profession-
als, must conform to a professional standard of care, skill and technical
proficiency normally exercised by professionals practicing in the same
field. 239 Although the standard of care can vary from jurisdiction tojuris-
diction, generally courts will look to the "nationally accepted or customary
standards of the practitioner's particular school of practice."2 40 Like
other professions, mental health professionals holding themselves out as
specialists are held to a specialist's standard of care. 241
Id.; see also RALPH REISNER & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, LAW AND THE MENTAL
HEALTH SYsTEM 64 (2d ed. 1990) (providing doctrinal overview). Alternative theo-
ries that have been recognized by the courts include intentional torts, breach of
contract and claims based on federal civil rights laws. See id. at 153-54.
238. Sea generally R. Kirkland Gable, Malpractice Liability of Psychologists, in THE
PROFESSIONAL PSYCHOLOGIST'S HANDBOOK (Bruce D. Sales ed., 1983) (discussing
malpractice liability of mental health professionals in terms of medical profession).
239. See REISNER & SLOBOGIN, supra note 237, at 64 (describing mental health
profession as science and art); Gable, supra note 238, at 459 (noting standard is
still evolving); Steven R. Smith, Mental Health Malpractice in the 1990s, 28 Hous. L.
REv. 209, 211 (1991) (noting malpractice claims would be more frequent with
clearly defined standard of care).
240. Gable, supra note 238, at 460 (noting varying standards of care for practi-
tioners). A minority of jurisdictions recognize the professional judgment rule,
which "shields a physician from liability for mere errors ofjudgment provided he
does what he thinks best after careful examination." REISNER & SLOBOGIN, supra
note 237, at 73 (discussing recognition of professional judgment rule). Before the
advent of nationally accepted or customary standards, the "locality rule" was used
in many jurisdictions. See Gable, supra note 238, at 460. Under this rule, mental
health practitioners were required to meet the standards of practice within their
own or similar localities. See id. The rule was established to take into account a
disparity of resources in some localities. See id.
241. See Gable, supra note 238, at 460 (noting that mental health professionals
holding themselves out as specialists will then be held to higher standard regard-
less of specialized training in treatment of disorder).
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Although the standard of care for a mental health professional can be
established, in part, by statute, codes of ethics and membership in a pro-
fessional organization, these are only factors that can be considered and
are not in and of themselves determinative.2 42 Further compounding this
problem is that despite these guidelines, mental health professionals have
traditionally been afforded a significant amount of leeway in treatment
and diagnostic decisions, depending on the particular characteristics of
the patient, the circumstances of the case and the practitioner's theoreti-
cal orientation.24 3 This flexibility in treatment decisions is also borne out
in the respectable minority doctrine, where a defense to negligence can be
established by showing that a particular intervention is supported by a "re-
spectable minority" of those practicing in the field. 244 Needless to say,
given the plethora of schools of psychotherapy and treatment interven-
tions, each as unempirically supported as the next, the respectable minor-
ity doctrine can be a strong defense against liability in the mental health
arena.
245
242. See id. at 461 (discussing factors that can be used in establishing appro-
priate standard of care).
243. See id. at 462 (noting that experts in psychology rarely agree on best
course of treatment). A claim in negligence can be brought against a mental
health professional for not utilizing a more appropriate intervention. See REISNER
& SLOBOGIN, supra note 237, at 75 (introducing respectable minority doctrine). A
claim of this type brought against a mental health professional will generally be
evaluated under the standard of what members of the profession would customa-
rily do under the circumstances. See id. (noting that under respectable minority
doctrine finding that therapeutic approach was not customary does not necessarily
lead to liability). Under the respectable minority doctrine, a psychological proce-
dure or intervention can be customary even if it is not used by a majority of practi-
tioners. See id. In describing the respectable minority doctrine as it applies to the
medical profession, one commentator noted: "[W]here two or more schools of
thought exist among competent members of the medical profession concerning
proper medical treatment for a given ailment, each of which is supported by re-
sponsible medical authority, it is not malpractice to be among the minority ... [of
those following] one of the accepted schools." Id. (citing Chumbler v. McClure, 505
F.2d 489, 492 (6th Cir. 1974)).
244. See REISNER & SLOBOGIN, supra note 237, at 75 (citing McHugh v. Audet,
72 F. Supp. 394 (M.D. Pa. 1947)).
245. See id. (noting that doctrine could be used to sanction use of less effec-
tive treatments); Smith, supra note 239, at 212-17 (noting increase in malpractice
premiums and size of claims in psychiatric cases). On the nebulous standard of
care for mental health professionals, Smith noted that:
[N]egligence requires a standard of professional care against which the
actions of the defendant-professional can be measured. Liability exists
only if the professional has failed to provide the same care as would a
reasonably prudent professional. The standard of practice for mental
health professionals is not as clearly or precisely defined as it is in many
areas of medicine. For instance, the standard of practice for treatment of
acute appendicitis is fairly uniform and clear; the standard of practice for
treatment of schizophrenia is not. The large number of "schools of
thought" in psychotherapy complicates efforts to define a clear standard
of care. The absence of a clear "correct" treatment makes it difficult to
assess the reasonableness of the therapist.
[Vol. 46: p. 33
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Although an exact standard of care for treatment and diagnostic deci-
sions is difficult to determine, there are a number of actions taken by a
mental health professional that are generally recognized by the courts as
constituting a breach of the standard of care. These include, but are not
limited to, physical contact and sexual relations with patients, failure to
prevent suicide and homicide by patients, inappropriate behavior with re-
spect to prescription drugs, and breaches of confidentiality.
246
The aspect of negligence of particular concern here involves the doc-
trine of informed consent. At least in theory, and in reality as far as the
courts are concerned, the decision-maker in any treatment context is the
patient.247 A physician and, by analogy, a therapist, thus has the obliga-
tion to list and explain all possible treatments to the patient. The thera-
pist must provide sufficient information to allow the patient to make an
Id. at 214 (footnotes omitted).
246. See Gable, supra note 238, at 464-76 (discussing dereliction of duty by
mental health professionals); Smith, supra note 239, at 221-42 (discussing areas of
established malpractice liability). Mental health professionals have a duty to recog-
nize and treat suicidal behavior and must act reasonably in trying to prevent a
patient from committing suicide, even if restraint and hospitalization are neces-
sary. See id. at 222. Malpractice liability may result from inadequate diagnosis lead-
ing to injury due to unnecessary or incorrect prescription of medication. See id. at
225. Sexual misconduct with patients is not only a violation of the ethical code of
conduct, but is also one of the biggest sources of malpractice litigation against the
mental health profession. See id. at 228. The protection of third parties is also a
potential source of significant liability for the mental health profession. See id. at
242-50 (discussing Tarasoff duty to protect (or warn)). In Tarasoff v. Regents of the
University of California, the Supreme Court of California imposed on therapists the
duty to take steps to warn a clearly identifiable victim at the expense of the thera-
pist-client relationship and its accompanying confidentiality. 551 P.2d 334, 343
(Cal. 1976).
247. See POPE & VASQUEZ, supra note 182, at 134-35 (proposing ideal concep-
tualization of informed consent in psychotherapy). The informed consent process
involves more than an explanation of the therapist's proposed treatment plan, and
the efficacy of any informed consent process can be determined by how well the
following questions are addressed: (1) Does the client understand who is providing
the service and the clinician's qualifications?; (2) Does the client understand the
reason for the first session?; (3) Does the client understand the nature, extent, and
possible consequences of the services offered?; (4) Does the client understand that
there may be alternatives to the proposed plan?; (5) Does the client understand
actual or potential treatment limitations (i.e., managed care session limits or a
therapist who may not be available after the first six months)?; (6) Does the client
understand the fees to be charged and policies regarding missed or canceled ap-
pointments?; (7) Does the client understand policies regarding access to the thera-
pist, to those providing coverage for the therapist, and to emergency services?; and
(8) Does the client understand exceptions to confidentiality of privilege? See id. at
132-34. Informed consent fulfills not only a legal obligation to provide the client
with relevant information to make an informed decision, but can serve a beneficial
therapeutic purpose as well. Research suggests that the informed consent process
increases the probability that a client will "become less anxious, follow the treat-
ment plan, recover more quickly and be more alert to unintended negative conse-
quences of treatment." Id. at 136.
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informed choice.2 48 In the field of psychotherapy, this obligation is not
taken seriously. One reason is that informed consent cases are rarely pur-
sued despite the fact that mental health professionals either completely
ignore the requirement or give it only superficial treatment. 249 Where,
however, reimbursement hinges on a specific treatment choice, a patient
denied the right to make that choice may well pursue legal relief.
In the medical context, the origins of the doctrine of informed con-
sent can be traced back to 1914 and Judge Cardozo's opinion in
248. See id. at 155-56 (discussing realities of informed consent, psychotherapy
and managed care). Ideally, upon completion of the diagnostic phase, the thera-
pist conducts a feedback session with the client in which the therapist explains the
diagnosis, the proposed treatment plan and any relevant treatment alternatives.
See id. at 155-57. In reality, the constraints placed on the therapist's time by man-
aged care organizations often prevent the therapist from conducting a feedback
session at all. See id. at 155-56. Cost considerations, previously out of place in the
treatment decision-making process, now play a greater role in the choices clini-
cians make. The integrity of the therapeutic relationship has been compromised
with the introduction of financial rewards in exchange for providing cost-effective
treatment. See Manos, supra note 182, at 217-19 (discussing financial incentives
offered to preferred providers). In addition to financial incentives, clinicians are
well aware of the reimbursement limitations on long-term or other expensive
modes of therapy, and, as a result, most psychotherapy patients undergo brief psy-
chotherapy never having been informed of the more costly alternatives. See POPE
& VASQUEZ, supra note 182, at 53-54. And if money is an insufficient motivator, gag
clauses ensure that patients are not informed of more expensive treatment op-
tions. Gag clauses are contractual obligations that prevent the provider from dis-
closing to the patient treatment alternatives that are not covered by the plan. See
Manos, supra note 182, at 219. Although the National Academies of Practice and
sixteen state legislatures have condemned the use of such gag rules, threats of
dismissal or blacklisting for disclosure of restricted information have kept gag
clauses alive and well. See id. at 219.
249. See Smith, supra note 239, at 23941 (discussing reasons why mental
health professionals fail to take doctrine of informed consent seriously). One
commentator noted:
In practice, mental health professionals frequently ignore the doctrine of
informed consent. Many factors may interfere with the consent process:
the limited mental competency of some patients, the failure to provide
sufficient information in an understandable form, a feeling of paternal-
ism toward patients, and the patient's young age. There is evidence that
in mental health treatment, informed consent is often not very effective,
either because professionals do not believe that patients are capable of
participating in the decision or because of a concern that patients will not
make decisions that are in their best interests. In other instances, profes-
sionals go through the process in a very formal way that does not convey
much information to the patient, or the information is presented in so-
phisticated... jargon that the patient cannot understand. Written con-
sent is desirable because it provides a record of the transaction, for the
therapist and the patient may take the process more seriously if there is a
document to be signed. The ultimate purpose, however, is to provide the
patient sufficient information for making an informed treatment
decision.
Id. at 23940.
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Schloendorff v. Society of New York HospitaL25 ° The original doctrine re-
quired nothing more than a patient's general agreement to treatment.
Such a showing immunized the physician from liability. 251 Although
Judge Cardozo's opinion in Schloendorff was instrumental in establishing
the right of a patient to informed consent, the doctrine itself did not re-
ceive substantial judicial attention until the early 1960s, when state courts
began to expand the doctrine to include a patient's right to know of the
risks involved in treatment and possible treatment alternatives. 2 52 The
doctrine of informed consent continued to evolve, and reached its zenith
in the early 1970s in the decision of Canterbury v. Spence.253
Today, the doctrine of informed consent incorporates both consent
to treatment and disclosure of all relevant information to the patient nec-
essary to make an informed treatment decision. 254 Although the doctrine
250. 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914) (stating that surgeon who performs opera-
tion without patient's consent is liable); see REISNER & SLOBOGIN, supra note 237, at
166 (noting doctrine of informed consent has "deep-seated roots in [American]
jurisprudence"); Susan M. Wolf, Toward a Systemic Theory of Informed Consent in Man-
aged Care, 35 Hous. L. REv. 1631, 1631-32 (1999) (noting that opinion came in
response to physician abuses). See generally JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF Doc.
TOR AND PATIENT (1984) (discussing evolution of informed consent doctrine). In
Schloendorff Judge Cardozo characterized the right as: "Every human being of adult
years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own
body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient's consent com-
mits an assault, for which he is liable in damages." REISNER & SLOBOGIN, supra note
237, at 166 (citing Schloendorff 105 N.E. at 93).
251. See REISNER & SLOBOGIN, supra note 237, at 166 (noting limited consent
necessary to immunize physician).
252. See id. (noting that after Schloendorff case doctrine of informed consent
was honored "more in the abstract than in reality"). Prior to the doctrine of in-
formed consent, the legal system conceptualized unconsented to touching in the
medical context as battery. See id. At the time, consent was simply the patient's
general consent to treatment and the treating physician did not have to inform the
patient of potential risks or treatment alternatives. See id. In the early 1960s, a
trend began to evolve at the state level, and a number of state courts expanded on
the doctrine by holding that a patient had a right to information regarding risks
and treatment alternatives. See id.; see a/sojoan H. Krause, ReconceptualizingInformed
Consent in an Era of Health Care Cost Containment, 85 IOWA L. REv. 261, 264 (1999)
(noting that cost containment strategies have negative impact on doctrine of in-
formed consent).
253. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (finding that physician has duty of reason-
able disclosure of choices relative to proposed therapy and any inherent and possi-
ble dangers); see Wolf, supra note 250, at 1632-33 (discussing Canterbury's expansion
of doctrine of informed consent and noting that by mid-1970s informed consent
was firmly established).
254. See REISNER & SLOBOGIN, supra note 237, at 166-67 (noting disagreement
on source and scope of doctrine). Commentators have noted that the doctrine of
informed consent serves a number of goals that can be categorized as ethical, deci-
sion-making, regulatory and compensatory. SeeJon F. Merz, On a Decision-Making
Paradigm of Medical Informed Consent, 14J. LEGAL MED. 231, 23743 (1993) (review-
ing commentary on goals of informed consent doctrine). The ethical goal revolves
around promoting the autonomy interests of the patient. See id. at 238-39. The
decision-making goal advocates for giving the patient all necessary information to
make a knowing and rational decision regarding treatment options. See id. at 239-
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is well established and active in the medical field, it has yet to be applied to
the field of psychology and psychiatry. 255 Again, this is directly attributa-
ble to the lack of a standard of care that can be applied to psychothera-
pists and the nebulous nature of the discipline itself.
Extrapolating to the mental health context, informed consent re-
quires that the patient be fully informed about treatment options and any
material risks involved. 25 6 Before RCTs and HMOs, and given the variabil-
ity in mental health interventions and the inability of the discipline to de-
fine associated risks of psychotherapy beyond basic emotional discomfort,
it was difficult to conceptualize what the exact risks of mental health treat-
ment were in terms of informed consent.257 With the advent of empiri-
cally validated treatments and the involvement of managed care, however,
it is now possible to point to more concrete risks associated with mental
health treatment. For example, one possible risk is spending more time in
therapy than necessary. Many of the empirically validated treatments that
are reimbursed by managed care are standardized, outcome driven and
time focused, and most patients should experience symptom reduction
within a specified number of sessions. Many non-empirically validated
therapies are not time focused, and a person can be in therapy for an
indeterminate period of time without clear treatment goals and specified
outcomes. As there is, in the HMO view, no reason to keep a person in
therapy any longer than needed for resolution of the presenting problem,
it is difficult to justify wasting that person's time in extended and possibly
ineffective therapy.
Another possible risk associated with not providing information re-
garding empirically supported treatments revolves around reimburse-
ment. HMOs will only reimburse for therapy that has been empirically
supported as being effective. This excludes a large number of treatments,
not to mention a significant number of psychological schools of thought.
A relatively uninformed consumer, unaware of these circumstances and
convinced by a therapist that a non-empirically supported therapy is best
for them, might enter into therapy that is not reimbursable, thereby incur-
ring out-of-pocket costs.
Another risk associated with HMOs is the threat to patient privacy.
This is especially relevant where patients are paying for psychotherapy out-
of-pocket because they do not want the fact of seeking therapy to be part
40. The regulatory goal places an affirmative duty on physicians to disclose infor-
mation and establishes appropriate standards of care. See id. at 240-42. The com-
pensatory goal is to provide monetary damages to patients that are injured as a
result of the physician's negligence. See id. at 242-43.
255. See REISNER & SLOBOGIN, supra note 237, at 167 (noting only limited ap-
plication to physically intrusive treatments such as electro-convulsive and pharma-
cological treatments for depression).
256. See Gable, supra note 238, at 464-68 (noting that informed consent is
usually inferred when patient voluntarily goes to see therapist).
257. See id. at 466-67 (discussing informed consent, material risk and
psychotherapy).
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of an HMO's database or because the relevant HMO does not have mental
health coverage. In this context, knowledge of empirically supported
treatments in the context of informed consent is crucial, because it allows
the consumer to pick the best treatment while incurring the least amount
of temporal and economic expense. Reimbursement is not the issue here,
so HMOs have no control over the treatment decision. Brevity of treat-
ment, however, attains an even greater importance, and the patient will
need to know what treatment can be the most effective in the shortest
time.
Even with these difficulties, informed consent for psychological treat-
ment should include the following elements: "(1) the diagnosis or pur-
pose of the treatment, (2) the nature and duration of the treatment, (3)
the risks involved, (4) the prospects of success or benefit, (5) possible dis-
advantages if the treatment is not undertaken, and (6) alternative methods of
treatment."258 Empirically validated treatments offer the solution of provid-
ing scientifically based alternatives to otherwise theoretical treatments with
questionable effectiveness. They may also mandate that such treatment be
offered to the exclusion of others. Accordingly, it is no longer the case
that a mental health professional should be immune from liability because
it cannot be demonstrated that one treatment is better than another.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although adequate for holding most professionals to certain levels of
conduct, the doctrine of negligence has traditionally been difficult to ap-
ply to the mental health arena.25 9 The reasons offered for this difficulty
all appear to revolve around the fact that psychology is still very much a
philosophy and not a science, making it difficult to establish a clear stan-
dard of care. Other, less philosophical, reasons have also been offered for
the difficulties of applying traditional principles of negligence to mental
health practitioners. 260 One such reason is the difficulty in proving com-
pensable damages. 261
Although many jurisdictions recognize damages for emotional dis-
tress, generally, in order to recover damages, a plaintiff must demonstrate
a physical injury.2 62 Needless to say, in the realm of psychotherapy, where
258. See id. at 466-67 (emphasis added) (discussing informed consent and
treatment goals).
259. See id. at 457 (noting that claims of malpractice against mental health
professionals are few in number).
260. See REISNER & SLOBOGIN, supra note 237, at 167 (discussing reasons why
doctrine of informed consent has seen application predominantly in bio-medical
field).
261. See id. (noting that recovery of monetary damages under some tort theo-
ries requires demonstration of physical injury).
262. See id. (acknowledging that "a patient who has been deprived of the right
to give informed consent to psychiatric or psychological treatment may have no
compensable damages").
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the damage is most likely to be emotional pain and suffering, physical in-
jury is difficult to demonstrate. 263
The other major and related reason offered for the inability to apply
the doctrine of informed consent to mental health treatment is that the
patient's injury must be a direct and proximate result of the treatment
itself.264 In addition, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the physician did
not provide the information necessary to make an informed decision that
a reasonable physician would have provided, and that the patient would
have made a different treatment choice if the information had been sup-
plied. As with the damages element, these elements of the plaintiffs case
can be very difficult to prove in the mental health context because it is
almost impossible to demonstrate that the treatment itself was the proxi-
mate cause of the resulting injury.2 65
The difficulty of using the doctrine of informed consent against a
mental health practitioner severely limits a plaintiffs options for bringing
a cause of action for poor treatment decisions. 266 Although there was a
time when this might have been justifiable because of the chaotic and un-
differentiated state of psychological theories of treatment, empirically vali-
dated treatments have changed the landscape of liability for the mental
health profession.26 7 In the past, the mechanism for holding mental
health professionals liable for lack of informed consent was missing.
Treatment was simply a philosophical and/or theoretical choice because
the discipline could not-or did not want to-demonstrate that one treat-
ment alternative was more effective than another.268 How could courts
hold a humanistically oriented therapist liable for not informing a patient
of the possible effectiveness of cognitive behavioral and pharmacological
interventions? They could not.
The advent of empirically validated treatments can provide the long-
missing mechanism for holding mental health professionals liable under
the doctrine of informed consent. If there are empirically validated treat-
ments available and the patient is not informed of this, then liability
should be close to automatic. The outcome of the treatment is irrelevant.
The theoretical orientation of the therapist is irrelevant. The purpose of
the doctrine of informed consent is to provide the individual with the in-
formation necessary to make an informed treatment choice. Although
still developing, there are ample data suggesting that certain treatments
for certain disorders are more effective than others. In terms of psycho-
263. See id. (noting trend of increased emotional distress liability).
264. See id. (explaining second difficulty of extending doctrine).
265. See id. (asserting that doctrine of informed consent will eventually be
applied to mental health treatment).
266. See id. (noting formidable difficulties of bringing such actions).
267. For a discussion of the history of psychological treatment, see supra notes
149-69 and accompanying text.
268. For a discussion of the philosophical and theoretical origins of psychol-
ogy, see supra notes 27-139 and accompanying text.
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therapy, there can be no informed consent if the patient is not given this
information.
As an added bonus, application of empirically validated treatments to
the doctrine of informed consent could eliminate the need for questiona-
ble defenses such as the respectable minority doctrine-a doctrine that
clearly, and perhaps inappropriately, limits the malpractice liability of
mental health professionals. Rather than allowing liability to be deter-
mined by the theoretical orientation of any given practitioner, which pro-
duces as many standards of care as there are psychological schools of
thought, empirically validated treatments will allow science to decide what
the standard should be. Similarly, the use of empirically validated treat-
ments is consistent with the ethical, decision-making, regulatory and com-
pensatory policy goals of the informed consent doctrine. Ethically,
knowledge of empirically validated treatments gives legal recognition to
the individual's right to make informed treatment decisions. Similarly, de-
cision-making is improved because the consumer has the most scientifi-
cally supported information available to make informed treatment
decisions. Moreover, it will be easier to regulate the profession, because
empirically validated treatments establish a clear and unequivocal stan-
dard of care. Finally, rather than having to fight the ever-changing and
nebulous standards of care characteristic of psychology, a plaintiff will be
able to point to a single standard of care, making it much easier to demon-
strate that the standard was breached and allowing for the recovery of
monetary damages.
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